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INTRODUCTION

The laws on parenthood in the United States are in great flux. The
continuing (r)evolution in childcare parenthood under the law (i.e.,
care, custody, and control of interests in children) has been chiefly
spurred by the dramatic increases in assisted reproduction births and
informal child adoptions; that is, adoptions recognized by courts only
after the completion of post-birth childcare acts, which typically
include same household residency and earlier parental-like
relationships. 1 Informal adoptions authorized by state laws go by
varying titles, including de facto, residency/hold out, and equitable
parent. 2
This (r)evolution in childcare parenthood laws has prompted
limited changes, to date, in legal parenthood in other contexts,
including child support, probate, and tort. Many needed changes in
nonchildcare parentage laws remain. Yet nonchildcare parentage
elsewhere should not always follow the (r)evolution in childcare
parenthood; rather, nonchildcare parentage laws should only follow
when the underlying policies are comparable.
There are constitutional limits on parenthood laws, whatever the
context. The constraints are found in both federal and state
constitutions. One constraint is that parenthood laws must be
rational. 3 Rationality is necessary when denials of Due Process or
Equal Protection are alleged. 4 To date, the rationality limits have not

*
1.
2.

3.

4.

Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby
College; J.D., The University of Chicago.
Brian Dakss, Adoption 101, CBS NEWS (Dec. 16, 2004, 7:17 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/adoption-101/.
See Lauren Gill, Note, Who’s Your Daddy? Defining Paternity Rights in the Context
of Free, Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715, 1745 (2013)
(describing how the law now recognizes “de facto parenthood” as a factor other than
biological ties in order to determine parental rights); Adam Stephenson, Arizona
Juvenile Law Legal Research: Resources and Strategies, 2 PHX. L. REV. 193, 266–67
(2009) (referring to the doctrine of “equitable adoption”). See generally UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (describing the various ways that an
individual may be presumed to be a parent of a child).
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970) (explaining that
statutory distinctions under due process must be “rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination”); United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.
2020) (“[P]recedent requires us to apply rational basis review to the equal protection
claim before us.”), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1462 (2021).
See, e.g., Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486–87; Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 18.
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been significantly applied to state policy choices in and outside of
childcare parenthood. 5
Rationality requirements should now constrain many new
American parenthood laws, as well as the influential parenthood law
reforms proposed by the Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC), 6
especially their Uniform Parentage Acts (UPAs). Further, some old
state laws, once sensible, have become irrational over time as new
childcare parenthood laws, with their new public policies, have
emerged. There has been too little coordination of older parentage
laws with the new public policies. 7 Genetic ties, heterosexual
marriage, and consensual sex generally underlie old laws, while
same-sex marriage, transgender rights, parental-like acts, and
intentions about future parenthood, as well as genes, opposite-sex
marriages, and sex underlie many new laws. 8 Coordination has been
hindered by the cloudy divisions within many states of the
lawmaking responsibilities of legislatures and courts. 9
This Article is the first to outline the irrationalities in many new
and old parentage laws. Irrationalities often arise when the laws
employ gendered terms like mother and father, husband and wife,
man and woman, and male and female. These terms require a parent
to be gender identified by the state, even when such an identity

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

See generally R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Rational Basis and Reasonableness
Review, 45 S. ILL. U. L. J. 415 (2021) (providing a comprehensive review and critique
of U.S. Supreme Court rational basis, heightened rational basis, and strict scrutiny
review); Brit Janeway Benjamin, Equal Protection and Ectogenesis, 23 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 779 (2021) (applying the various levels of Equal Protection review to a
potential statute prohibiting the use of ectogenesis).
The ULC is also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. About Us, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/
overview [https://perma.cc/46FV-ZSKZ] (last visited May 8, 2022).
But see S.B. 464, 2021 Leg. (Wis. 2021) (proposing gender-neutral parentage
terminology changes for over 100 laws, replacing terms like “mother” with “expectant
parent,” “biological father” with “natural parent,” and “father” and “mother” with
“parent”).
See Jeffrey A. Parness, Formalities for Informal Adoptions, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 373,
373–74 (2015).
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized an equitable adoption
doctrine in probate proceedings solely through precedent but has failed to recognize a
similar doctrine in child custody proceedings on separation of powers grounds. See In
re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 791–95 (Ill. 2015). See generally Jeffrey A. Parness,
State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents: More Principled
Allocations of Powers and More Rational Distinctions, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 479
(2017).
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clashes with the parent’s own gender identification. 10 More
importantly, these gendered terms frequently clash with public
policies underlying parentage laws, new and old, that are not
dependent upon any form of gender identity. 11 As a result, these
terms create differential treatment of people, as between stateidentified men and state-identified women, where the distinctions
make no sense.
Parentage laws should generally be designated for a person, sperm
donor, sperm provider, egg donor, egg provider, spouse, birth giver,
and the like. Nongendered parentage laws, for many of us, will not
end our speaking of mothers and fathers. But such laws will sensitize
more of us some people’s preferences without diminishing and, in
fact, likely enhancing, the underlying public policies. 12 Some
discomfort perhaps, but greater respect for all within our
communities. 13
Beyond gender identity, irrationalities also arise when there are
distinctions without policy justifications. In the childcare parent
context, there are troubling divides between a hold out/residency
parent and a de facto parent. 14 Outside of childcare, there are
troubling divides in survivorship, heirship, and personal injury
claims. 15
10.

11.

12.
13.

14.
15.

See Annie Tritt, States are Starting to Recognize a Third Gender. Here’s What That
Means for Nonbinary Youth., VOX, https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/3/28/
17100252/trans-nonbinary-third-gender-youth-legal-recognition
[https://perma.cc/ZT7X-8JJJ] (Apr. 2, 2018, 9:08 AM). Many states do not allow
citizens to change the sex designation on their birth certificate. But see In re ChildersGray, 487 P.3d 96, 129 (Utah 2021) (recognizing judicial power to adjudicate a
petition for a different designation).
Gender identity laws discussed herein are distinct from gender, gender discrimination,
and sexual orientation laws, though distinctions are sometimes difficult to draw. See,
e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(Q) (West 2022) (explaining that “unlawful
discrimination” includes acts involving “perceived” sex and “sexual orientation”);
Equality Act, H.R. 5, 117th Cong. § 305 (2021) (stating that a reference to “sex” shall
be considered a reference to “sex, sexual orientation, gender identity”).
See Parness, supra note 9, at 509–12.
Unfortunately, irrational gender identity laws exist outside the context of parenthood.
See, e.g., Arkansas Save Adolescents from Experimentation (SAFE) Act, H.B. 1570,
93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021) (banning access to gender-affirming care
for people under eighteen years of age); Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 498–
500 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that a professor who was reprimanded for refusing to use
a student’s preferred pronouns had sufficiently pleaded free-speech and free-exercise
claims).
See Parness, supra note 8, at 390–95.
See Paul W. Norris, Distribution of Personal Injury Proceeds to Heirs of a
Decedent’s Estate, NAT’L L. REV. (May 23, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/distribution-personal-injury-proceeds-to-heirs-decedent-s-estate
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This Article demonstrates the disconnect between gender identity
and the policies underlying parentage laws in several contexts,
including parenthood for childcare and child support purposes (as
with some spousal, assisted reproduction, and voluntary
acknowledgment parents); 16 for probate purposes (as with deceased
parents); 17 for tort purposes (as with grieving parents); 18 and for
expecting parent purposes (as with some voluntary acknowledgment,
assisted reproduction, and putative parents). 19
The Article further demonstrates the lack of adequate justification
for distinguishing between parents in a single context and in varying
contexts, even where the laws are nongendered. 20 Irrationalities here
are illustrated within the childcare, tort, and probate settings. 21
A few notes of caution. First, legal parentage is contextual. Thus, a
person may be defined as a legal parent for one purpose, like child
support, but not for another purpose, like child custody. There is no
per se irrationality in varying intrastate definitions. These variations
can be challenging, though, as when the general policy serving the
best interests of children means the same person is responsible for
child support, but is not afforded child custody opportunities. 22
A second note of caution. In assessing parentage laws for
rationality, interstate variations will frequently arise in a single
context. Many such variations are not irrational. Thus, one state may
determine that the benefits of recognizing childcare parenthood via
surrogacy outweigh the costs, while another state may weigh things

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

[https://perma.cc/5L9E-BEP4]. Naturally, troubling divides are more carefully
scrutinized when suspect or quasi-suspect classes are differentiated. See, e.g., Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895–96 (Iowa 2009) (applying heightened scrutiny for
sexual orientation divides).
See infra Parts III–V.
See infra text accompanying notes 217–23.
See infra text accompanying notes 233–42.
See infra text accompanying notes 310–29.
See infra text accompanying note 59.
See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. Irrationalities between contexts are
mitigated when statutory definitions on parentage are absent/inadequate where courts
then employ the in pari-materia doctrine. See, e.g., Potts v. Anastasia, No.
M202000170COAR3CV, 2021 WL 2226622, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2021)
(citing Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)) (discussing standing to
seek custody and visitation of minor children conceived by in vitro fertilization);
LeFever v. Matthews, No. 353106, 2021 WL 1232747, at *1– 2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr.
1, 2021).
See, e.g., In re Baby A., 944 So. 2d 380, 395 n.21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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differently. 23 Interstate variations have, in fact, been invited by the
U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress. 24 The U.S. Supreme
Court and Congress have largely deferred to state lawmakers on
defining parentage. 25 There are a few federal norms, however, found
in both constitutional precedent 26 and legislation. 27
II. SPOUSAL PARENT
The ULC has promulgated three versions of its Uniform Parentage
Act, in 1973, 2000 (amended a bit in 2002), and 2017. 28 All UPAs
23.

24.
25.
26.

27.

28.

Compare, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 2022) (surrogacy
restricted), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-121 (West 2022) (in intestate
succession, there may be enforceable or unenforceable “gestational carrier”
agreements where the person giving birth may or may not be the “genetic mother”),
and 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8.1-801 (West 2021) (gestational carrier agreement),
and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 26.26A.700 (West 2022) (both gestational and genetic
surrogacy pacts recognized).
See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (“In the vast majority of cases, state
law determines the final outcome” when resolving “the legal problems arising from
the parent-child relationship.”).
Id.
Herein a childcare parent embodies an existing legal parent with “care, custody and
control” interests in a child or children. Such a parent’s interests are recognized as
within a federal constitutional liberty interest. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65–66 (2000). The definition of a “parent” who has this right has been chiefly left
to state lawmakers (both legislators and common lawmaking judges) by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare
Parents, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 965, 978–83 (2016) (criticizing the court’s deferral to
state lawmaking on federal constitutional childcare parentage). Elaborations on the
scope of the constitutional right are elusive. A state statutory review of the “rights of a
parent of a minor child,” and the limits on these rights, is found in FLA. STAT. ANN. §
1014.04 (West 2021). The Supreme Court has also recognized some procedural due
process protections from state interference with parental rights. See, e.g., Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (explaining due process requires clear and
convincing evidence before a state can terminate parental rights). Federal statutes
sometimes address the protections accompanying legal parentage, which can be
substantive or procedural. Consider the dictates of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (providing no termination of parental rights in an Indian
Child without “evidence beyond a reasonable doubt” that “the continued custody of
the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child”). Certain ICWA provisions have been challenged. See
Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 267–68 (5th Cir. 2021).
On federal statutes embodying parentage requirements, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
666(a)(3), (5)(B)(ii). “[P]rocedures concerning paternity establishment” required of
all states participating in federal child welfare subsidy program, per 42 U.S.C. §§ 666
and 654(2).
See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2017).
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recognize childcare parentage in actual and would-be spouses of birth
mothers. 29 The 1973 UPA deems “a man is presumed a natural father
of a child if . . . he and the child’s mother are or have been married to
each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300
days after the marriage is terminated.” 30 So, a man’s marriage to a
pregnant or nonpregnant woman prompts parentage in the man for a
child born or conceived during the marriage, whether or not the man
is a biological parent. For children born into marriage via “artificial
insemination” utilizing the semen not donated by a husband, there are
additional requirements for male spousal parentage, including that
the husband “consent” and that there be “supervision of a licensed
physician.” 31
The 2000 UPA, as amended in 2002, similarly recognizes
presumptive male spousal parentage for children born of sex. 32 And it
recognizes nonpresumptive and nonspousal male parentage via
consent to “assisted reproduction, whether or not there was sperm
donation.” 33 Further, the 2000 UPA recognizes nonpresumptive male

29.
30.

31.

32.

33.

Jeffrey A. Parness, Illinois Childcare Parentage Law (R)Evolution, 51 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 911, 920–21 (2020).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973). The 1973, 2000, and 2017
UPAs also recognize male parentage presumptions in certain men who married or
attempted to marry the natural mothers before or after the births. Id. § 4(a)(3); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1)(c), (a)(2)(3) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). State laws include
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/204(a)(3) (West 2021) and CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a)
(West 2022). Where there is no marriage or clear evidence of an attempt to marry,
perhaps a “putative spouse” approach might be taken, as is done in some probate
cases. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Fairness and the Putative Spouse, 81 LA. L. REV. 1235
(2021).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (dealing with this form but not
other forms of artificial insemination, that raise “complex and serious legal
problems,” as was noted in the earlier Section 5 Comment). Failure to follow Section
5 mandates may nevertheless prompt a marital parentage presumption under Section 4
for a child born of artificial insemination. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1)
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (presuming that the husband is the natural father of a child
born to his wife “during the marriage”).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002) (“fatherchild relationship”). UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)–(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000)
(amended 2002) (providing that the “man is presumed to be the father” in settings of
actual or attempted marriage to the person giving birth).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 201(b)(5), 703 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002)
(man’s consent to “assisted reproduction by a woman”).
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parentage via a “validated” gestational mother “agreement,” 34 where
the “intended parents” are “the man and the woman” who need not be
married. 35 Thus actual biological ties are again not required for male
spousal parentage of a child born of sex 36 and are not always required
for legal parentage in spouses when a child is born of assisted
reproduction to their mates.
The 2017 UPA also recognizes spousal parentage, but in more (but
not complete) gender-neutral terms. It applies its spousal parent
presumption to an “individual” who was married to, or attempted to
marry, the “woman who gave birth.” 37
Nonpresumptive spousal parentage under the 2017 UPA, as under
the 2000 UPA, attaches to spouses whose mates give birth via certain
nonsurrogacy “assisted reproduction.” 38 Here, consent—not the
marriage itself—is key. 39 And here, these spouses need not be sperm
or egg donors. 40 Further, spouses can become parents through either
gestational or genetic surrogacy agreements. 41
Current state spousal parentage laws can reflect any of the UPAs,
leading to interstate variations. For example, spousal parentage can
arise from a marriage in existence at the time of birth, 42 at the time of

34.
35.
36.

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.

42.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(6) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002) (“fatherchild relationship”). Id. § 801(a) (contemplating agreement with “prospective
gestational mother” by “donor” or by “intended parents”).
Id. § 801(b).
Id. § 607(b). Lack of biological ties does not always allow male spousal parentage
presumption rebuttals, as where the child is over two or when the spouse never
engaged in relevant sex and never “openly held out the child as his own.” Id. §
607(b)(2); see also id. § 608 (denying genetic testing order involving alleged
biological father under certain circumstances).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). To date, only a few
states expressly recognize marital parentage in an identified female spouse of one
giving birth. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.115(1)(a) (West. 2022); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15C. § 401(a)(1) (West 2022).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (with the consent requisites in
UPA § 704).
See id. § 704.
Id. § 703 (“An individual who consents . . . to assisted reproduction by a woman with
the intent to be a parent of the child conceived . . . .”).
Id. § 801(3) (including surrogacy pact with “one or more intended parents” and the
person who will give birth); see also id. §§ 802–807 (comparable requirements for
each form of agreement); id. §§ 808–812 (additional special rules for gestational
surrogacy pacts); id. §§ 813–818 (discussing genetic surrogacy pacts).
Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-20(a) (West. 2022) (child “born in wedlock or
within the usual period of gestation thereafter”), with HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5844(a)(1) (West. 2022) (“child is born during the marriage”), and ALA. CODE § 26-17204(a)(1) (2022) (spousal parentage if “child is born during the marriage”), and 750
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conception, 43 or sometime during pregnancy though not at
conception or birth. 44 Thus, on occasion there can be two spousal
parents beyond the person giving birth. 45
Current state laws, like the UPAs, do not address spousal parentage
arising from common law marriages. Yet some state judicial
precedents consider common law marriages when assessing custodial
interests in resolving family disputes. 46
The circumstances allowing later disestablishments of spousal
parentage presumptions also vary interstate. Differences occur
because state policies differ on who can seek to rebut such a
presumption. 47 Biological ties are less, or not, important where, as
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, 48 marriage is deemed “the
basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits and

43.
44.
45.

46.

47.

48.

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/204(a)(1) (West. 2022) (“person” married to one who gives
birth “during marriage” or “substantially similar legal relationship”).
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1433(e) (West 2015) (discussing marriage at
time of conception or birth).
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(1) (2022) (marriage “at any time in the
ten months preceding the birth”), invalidated by McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492
(Ariz. 2017).
See Wyoming v. EKB, 35 P.3d 1224, 1229 (Wyo. 2001) (ruling where two spousal
parents as birth mother was married twice during pregnancy; first husband was
presumed spousal parent as child was born within 300 days of his divorce, while
second husband was presumed spousal parent as he was married to birth mother at the
time of birth); Ex parte Kimbrell, 180 So. 3d 30, 34 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (involving
a child born to woman and her supposed second husband, though there was no
divorce from her first husband; both men were presumed spousal parents).
See, e.g., Valentine v. Wetzel, No. 790 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 1130441, at *5 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2019) (deciding that while state law barred common law marriages entered
into after January, 2005, the court would apply the earlier common law marriage
norms to conduct before 2005 since the bar was not made retroactive); In re Marriage
of Hogsett & Neale, 480 P.3d 696, 698 (Colo. App. 2018) (Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644 (2015) applied retroactively to give same-sex couple right to prove common
law marriage for purposes of a dissolution proceeding); Gill v. Nostrand, 206 A.3d
869, 873 (D.C. 2019) (applying common law marriage doctrine in case involving
alimony and marital property).
Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.070(1)(a), (2) (West 2022) (showing that
spousal parentage presumption may be challenged “by either spouse,” with no
challenge by another person “as long as the spouses are married and are cohabiting,
unless both spouses consent”), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/610(a) (West
2022) (involving motion by a “parent, presumed parent, acknowledged parent,
adjudicated parent, alleged parent or the child” seeking genetic testing to overcome
spousal parentage can be denied in certain circumstances).
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670.
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responsibilities,” including child custody and support. 49 Here, a
parentage presumption is, at best, difficult to overcome by a person
(usually an alleged sperm donor) outside the marriage. 50 By contrast,
as in Vermont, biological ties can be more important. 51 There, a
presumed parent is a person who is married to the person giving birth
at the time of the birth of a child born of consensual sex. 52 But there,
an alleged unwed sperm donor may challenge the presumption within
two years of discovering “the potential genetic parentage.” 53 In some
states, like Iowa and Texas, 54 there are significant state constitutional
protections of the parental opportunity interests of sperm donors even
where those giving birth arising from sex are married to others.
The foregoing review of spousal parentage laws reveals several
irrationalities, only some of which have been eliminated by the
courts. States following the 1973 and 2000 UPAs only regard spousal
parentage laws applicable to men (self-identified or identified by the
state?). 55 Yet with marriage equality, the laws should apply to all
49.

50.

51.
52.
53.
54.

55.

See, e.g., McLaughlin, 401 P.3d 492, 496 (Ariz. 2017) (holding that marital paternity
presumption applies to female spouse of birth mother; Arizona spousal parentage
presumption statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(1) (1995) invalidated by
McLaughlin, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017), does not specifically reference any likelihood
of biological ties in the spouse, but rather addresses the spouse’s rights and
responsibilities).
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131–32 (1989) (finding that federal
constitution, per a split, court does not bar a marital parentage presumption law where
the presumption cannot be rebutted by an unwed genetic parent); Strauser v. Stahr,
726 A.2d 1052, 1053–54 (Pa. 1999) (concluding that marital presumption not
rebuttable by genetic father where marriage is intact); B.S. v. T.M., 782 A.2d 1031,
1035 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (precluding irrebuttable marital parent presumption here as
marriage was not intact at relevant times). While an unwed biological father may not
himself be able to petition for an adjudication of child custody parentage, he may still
be able to be pursued, as by state welfare officials seeking welfare payment
reimbursements, for an adjudication of child support parentage, especially when a
cuckolded husband is disestablished as a presumed parent. See, e.g., Vargo v.
Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 462 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
See VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15C, § 401 (West 2022) (listing circumstances in which
someone is a presumed parent to a child based on biological ties); id. § 303 (listing
specific circumstances in which a presumed parent may deny parentage).
Id. § 401(a)(1).
Id. § 402(b)(2) (allowing the court to choose not to disestablish the spousal parentage
presumption).
See Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 187, 190 (Iowa 1999) (recognizing an
unwed biological father has “a liberty interest in challenging paternity” of the husband
of a birth mother under Iowa Due Process Clause); In re Interest of J.W.T., 872
S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994) (recognizing similar interest per Texas Constitution),
superseded by statute, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.101(a)(3) (West 1996).
Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002)
(describing only a presumption of paternity for men), and UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §
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persons who are the spouses of those who give birth. Low hanging
fruit here; this distinction has already fallen in several cases, as it has
in the 2017 UPA. 56
A more challenging rationality analysis arises when there are births
without sex. The more progressive 2017 UPA distinguishes between
presumed spousal parents of children born to some mates and
nonpresumed spousal parents of children born to other mates. 57 A
spouse can prompt a pregnancy and spousal parentage in a mate by
extramarital sex or by assisted reproduction (with or without a
surrogate). The mate is only a presumed parent where there was
extramarital sex. 58 Presumptions can be difficult for a spousal parent
to rebut. Yet only with a child born of sex was there an actual sexual
liaison with one outside the marriage, which may be deemed a more
significant betrayal than a spouse’s assisted reproduction pregnancy
and birth utilizing an anonymous sperm donor.
Finally, is there any significance to employing terms like husband,
wife, mother, and father in spousal parent laws, as per the older
UPAs, where children are born of sex? How people are genderidentified, by themselves or by others, has nothing to do with actual
or presumed biological ties (via sperm).
III. RESIDENCY/HOLD OUT AND/OR DE FACTO PARENT
Residency/hold out parentage and de facto parentage are two
childcare parenthood forms that are dependent upon parental-like
acts, allowing parentage in those without marital, biological, or
formal adoption ties. These forms have been prompted by the ULC
and the American Law Institute (ALI). 59 Newer laws reflecting these
forms increasingly contain nongendered terms like individual and
person. Nevertheless, irrationalities are found even in some of these
newer laws where distinctions are drawn without adequate
justifications.

56.
57.
58.
59.

4(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973), with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2017) (describing a presumption of parentage for individuals).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (describing a presumption of
parentage for individuals rather than men).
Id. §§ 201, 204 (describing ways in which a parent-child relationship is established
and when parentage is presumed but providing processes for non-presumed parents to
establish the same).
See id. §§ 201–204 (defining when a person is a presumed parent of a child born of
sex and excluding assisted reproduction from those enumerated).
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (AM. L. INST. 2002) [hereinafter 2000 ALI
PRINCIPLES] (recognizing de facto parentage).
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A. Residency/Hold Out Parent
All UPAs recognize childcare parentage in some who have resided
with living children whom they held out as their own. 60 To date, no
UPA (and no state law) has recognized residency/hold out childcare
parents where there is common residency with, and support of,
expecting legal parents (i.e., those pregnant or those awaiting formal
adoption approval).
The 1973 UPA is quite different than the later UPAs on
residency/hold out parentage. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act has
this parentage presumption:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of the child if . . .
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child. 61
The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act altered the presumption. It says:
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if: . . .
(5) for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in the
same household with the child and openly held out the child
as his own. 62
The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act altered a the presumption again. It
says:
(a) An individual is presumed to be a parent of a child if: . . .
(2) the individual resided in the same household with the child
for the first two years of the life of the child, including
periods of temporary absence, and openly held out the child
as the individual’s child. 63
The 2000 ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (ALI
Principles) also recognize forms of residency/hold out parentage.
One form, like the 2000 and 2017 UPAs, encompasses “a parent by
estoppel” who “lived with the child since the child’s birth,” while
60.
61.
62.
63.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §
204(a)(5) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §
204(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
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holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a
parent as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child
together each with full parental rights and responsibilities.64
Many current state laws reflect the policies of these proposed laws.
Yet only a few to date have expressly extended the laws beyond
publicly
identified
opposite-sex
couples. 65
Nevertheless,
residency/hold out parentage is generally available to an identified
female partner of one giving birth due to equality demands.66
Residency/hold out parentage is generally unavailable to a partner of
one identified as a male who is a parent at birth where the person
giving birth remains a legal parent and where state laws disallow
three custodial parents. 67
There are varying state laws reflecting the distinct UPA approaches
to residency/hold out parentage. 68 In California, following the 1973
64.
65.

66.

67.

68.

2002 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) (further requiring a finding of
serving the child’s best interests).
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 401(a)(4) (West 2022) (using the term “person”
instead of “man”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.115(1)(b) (West 2022) (using
the term “individual” instead of “man”). On the need to treat equally all people
involved in residency/hold out settings, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Marriage Equality:
Parentage (In)Equality, 32 WIS. J. L., GEND. & SOC’Y 179, 189 (2017).
See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (finding former unwed
lesbian partner a child support parent under California statutory law on presumed
natural hold out fathers); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 966, 970
(Vt. 2006) (upon dissolution of civil union of lesbian couple, both women are
custodial parents as statute making husband the presumed “natural parent” of a child
born to his wife was applicable via a second statute saying that civil union and
married couples shall have the “same” rights (citing VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15, § 308(4)
(repealed 2018))); id. § 1204(f). Similar equality mandates operate when there is
common law, rather than statutory, hold out parentage. See, e.g., Wendy G-M. v. Erin
G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, From
Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their Children, 77 LAW.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 212–19 (2014) (even where statutes only explicitly
recognize residency/hold out parentage for men, women are sometimes deemed
parents under the statutes).
However, in California, there can be three legal parents, including the birth mother,
her spouse, and a residency. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2020) (three
parents will be recognized when recognition of only two parents “would be
detrimental to the child”). Florida law does not support enforcement of an agreement
on sharing child custody when entered into by the married birth mother, her spouse,
and the biological father of a child born of sex. See C.G. v. J.R., 130 So. 3d 776, 782
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
There are also doctrines that effectively recognize residency/hold out parentage,
though with different terms and some different norms. See, e.g., J.S.B. v. S.R.V., 630
S.W.3d 693, 695 (Ky. 2021) (employing a birth mother’s “parental waiver” doctrine
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UPA, a man is “presumed to be the natural father of a child” if he
“received the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his natural child.” 69 There is no explicit requirement that a man who
holds out a child as “his natural child” needs to have any beliefs
about his actual biological ties. 70 Thus, California cases 71 have
recognized as presumed parents those who knew there were no
biological ties, but who acted in the community as if there were. 72
Some U.S. state laws recognize residency/hold out parentage only for
those who raise children from birth, 73 following the 2017 UPA. 74
There are other interstate variations in residency/hold out
parentage. Some state laws do not require receipt into the home.75
Some state laws more explicitly require existing legal parents to

69.

70.
71.

72.

73.

74.
75.

to allow parentage in a person who could not formally adopt children, but who held
children out as one’s own while residing with them for some time).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2021). The presumption has been sustained when
challenged on the ground of interfering with federal constitutional childcare interest.
See, e.g., R.M. v. T.A., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 836, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)
(preponderance of evidence norm is used to establish presumption); see also S.F.
Hum. Servs. Agency v. A.V., 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8870, at *14–15 (Cal.
App. 1st Div. 4) (indicating what constitutes receipt into the home).
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2021).
See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 15 (Cal. 4th 2004) (Both Paul (also the husband)
and Heriberto (also the biological father) were each judicially declared to be
“presumed” California fathers because each received Jesusa V. into his home and held
her out as his natural child.); see also Barnes v. Cypert, No. S106843, 2006 WL
3351790 (Cal. App. Nov. 21, 2006) (birth mother’s uncle is a presumed parent); In re
Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 124 (Cal. App. 2d Div. 7 2002) (presumed
residency/hold out parent need not have, or even claim to have, biological ties).
See In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 15. How long an alleged residency/hold out parent
must so act is determined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., In re J.B., No. B291208,
2019 WL 1451304 (Cal. App. 2d Div. 1 2019) (finding a two day hold out insufficient
for presumed parent status).
Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2021) (A man is presumed to
be the father if “during the first two years of the child’s life, he continuously resided
in the household in which the child resided and he represented to others that the child
was his own[.]”); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.115(1)(a)(iii)(b) (West
2022), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(d) (West 2021) (A person is presumed
to be the natural father if “while the child is under the age of majority, the person
receives the child into the person's home and openly represents the child to be the
person’s natural child[.]”).
Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.115 (West 2022) (evidencing how
Washington amended the presumption of parentage statute to reflect the 2017 UPA),
with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.115 (West 2021).
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4)–(5) (West 2021) (either receives the child
into his home or “provides support for the child”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8201(c)(3) (West 2022) (alteration in original) (“[P]arental role . . . [and] bonded and
dependent relationship . . . that is parental in nature.”).
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agree to such matters as residency or hold outs by nonparents who
can later morph into new childcare parents, on equal footing with
existing legal parents. 76
State laws also vary on the circumstances allowing, and the
standing available to present, a challenge to residency/hold out
parentage. Consider challenges by nonresident sperm providers who
did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that
residency/hold out was being undertaken by a nonparent together
with an existing legal parent (often the person giving birth). In
Vermont, such a provider may challenge a residency/hold out
parentage within two years of “discovering the potential genetic
parentage” in cases where there was no earlier actual or reasonably
assumed knowledge of the potential due to “material
misrepresentation or concealment.” 77 Elsewhere, there are different
time limits, 78 as well as the unavailability of “concealment” as a
condition of extending the normal time limits for challenging
residency/hold out parents. 79

76.

77.
78.

79.

See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01(1) (West 2021) (including single parent’s
“agreement” to same household residency for one wishing to be deemed a de facto
parent); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 401(a)(4) (West 2022) (presuming residency/hold
out parent if in the child’s first two years, where “another parent” of the child jointly
held the child out as presumed parent’s child). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:1743(a)(4)–(5) (West 2021) (allowing a man to be presumed to be the biological father
of a child on equal footing with the unwed birth mother, if he “openly hold out the
child as his natural child” and either “receives the child into his home” or “provides
support for the child”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West 2021) (marital status of
the parents does not impact the parent-child relationship).
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 401(a)(4), (b)(2) (West 2022).
Compare, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017)
(residence/hold out in child’s first two years); § 204(b); § 608(b) (stating a
presumption rebuttal usually must be presented before the child turns two), with UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (residence/hold out where child is
“under the age of majority”); id. § 6(b) (“at any time”).
Compare, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); id. §
204(b); id. § 608(b) (excluding two year limit on challenging residency/hold out
parentage of an individual from operating when the individual is “not a genetic parent,
never resided with the child, and never held out the child as the presumed parent’s
child”), and UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended
2002); id. § 204(b); id. § 607(b) (barring two year limit on actions to disprove earlier
determined presumed residency/hold out parentage in a man from operating when
there was, in fact, no cohabitation or sexual intercourse during the probable time of
conception and the presumed parent never openly held out the child as his own), with
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); id. § 6(b) (providing that
presumed residency/hold out parentage can be challenged “at any time”).
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No state to date follows the 2000 ALI Principles on parentage by
estoppel, where a co-parenting pact with a potential residency/hold
out parent must be undertaken by, if there are, two existing legal
parents. 80 Yet, the 2000 ALI Principles are most appropriate, since
one existing legal parent, as in a formal adoption, generally should
have no agency or common authority to surrender the parental
childcare rights of a second existing legal parent. 81
B. De Facto Parent
The 2017 UPA, but neither of its UPA predecessors, expressly
recognizes “de facto” parenthood as a form of parentage for those
without biological or formal adoption ties. 82 Such parenthood is
dependent upon meeting far more explicit terms to gain shared
custody between existing legal parents and nonparents than the terms
underlying residency/hold out parentage. 83 For de facto parentage, an
existing legal parent must have “fostered or supported” a “bonded
and dependent relationship” between the child and the nonparent
which is “parental in nature;” 84 the nonparent must have held out the
child as the nonparent’s own child and undertaken “full and
permanent” parental responsibilities; 85 and the nonparent must have
“resided with the child as a regular member of the child’s household
for a significant period of time.” 86
Of particular note on de facto parentage is the limit on who can
commence a proceeding to establish such parentage. Commencement
80.
81.
82.

83.

84.
85.
86.

See 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 2.03(1)(b)(iii).
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, The Constitutional Limits on Custodial and Support
Parentage by Consent, 56 ID. L. REV. 421, 467–78 (2020) [hereinafter Constitutional
Limits].
The term “de facto” parent did not originate in the 2017 UPA. The Comment to the
Act indicates it’s de facto parentage standard was modeled on Maine and Delaware
statutes. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). The term was
also employed in the 2000 ALI Principles. 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, §
2.03(1); see also RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW app. B § 1.72 (AM. L.
INST., TENTATIVE DRAFT, No. 3, 2021), [hereinafter ALI Restatement Draft] (§ 1.72
on de facto parentage is one of the “black letter” sections approved by membership).
Expecting legal parents are foreclosed under the 2017 UPA from being bound to any
agreements on de facto parentage for children to be born of sex later, as the model law
requires, for example, “a bonded and dependent relationship with the child.” UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(5) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). Thus, there is not recognized a
possible “bonded and dependent relationship” with a fetus, a fertilized egg, or some
child of sex yet unconceived. Id.
Id. § 609(d)(5)–(6).
Id. § 609(d)(3)–(4).
Id. § 609(d)(1).
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may only be undertaken by an “individual” who is “alive” and who
“claims to be a de facto parent of the child.” 87
The 2000 ALI Principles, 88 and an ALI Draft of a Restatement of
the Law: Children and the Law, 89 also recognize forms of “de facto”
parentage for those without biological or formal adoption ties. Each
form requires both residence and consent by an existing legal
“parent,” but only the 2000 Principles further recognize a “parent by
estoppel.” 90
Under the 2000 ALI Principles, a “parent by estoppel” is “not a
legal parent.” 91 But is an individual who must have lived with the
child, without an obligation to pay child support and without “a
reasonable, good-faith belief” of biological ties, and who did so with
either “a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal parent
(or, if there are two legal parents, both parents)” or “an agreement
with the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both
parents).” 92
The 2000 ALI Principles recognize as a “de facto parent” one who
is “other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel” and who lived
with and cared for the child for at least two years under an
“agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship.” 93 A
87.
88.

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.

Id. § 609(a).
2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, §§ 2.03(1)(c)(ii), 3.02(1)(c) (including
requirements or residence with the child, as well as “the agreement of a legal parent to
form a parent-child relationship” unless the legal parent completely fails, or is unable,
to perform caretaking functions).
ALI Restatement Draft, supra note 82, app. B §1.72(a) (requirements include
residence with the child, as well as establishing that “a parent consented to and
fostered the formation of the parent-child relationship”).
Under the 2000 ALI Principles, a legal parent, a parent by estoppel and a de facto
parent each has standing to pursue/participate in an action involving judicial
allocation of custodial and decision-making responsibility for a child. Id. § 2.04(1).
“A legal parent is an individual who is defined as a parent under other state law.” Id.
§ 2.03(1)(a).
Id. § 2.03(1)(b).
Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(iii)–(iv).
Id. § 2.03(1)(c). Alternatively, a de facto parent is one who is other than a legal parent
or a parent by estoppel and who lived with and cared for the child for at least two
years “as a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform
caretaking functions.” Id. Precedents predating the 2000 ALI Principles recognize the
concept of de facto parentage in different settings. See, e.g., In re Kieshia E., 859 P.2d
1290, 1296 (Cal. 1993) (standing of a de facto parent in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding); In re Dependency of J.H., 815 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wash. 1991) (allowing
in a delinquency case, permissive intervention, not intervention as of right, to some
foster parents claiming de facto (or psychological) parent status); In re B.G., 523 P.2d
244, 254 (Cal. 1974) (leaving un resolved whether a de facto parent may have the
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de facto parent, unlike a legal parent or a parent by estoppel, has no
presumptive right to “an allocation of decisionmaking responsibility”
for the child. 94 Further, a de facto parent has no presumptive right of
“access to the child’s school and health-care records to which legal
parents have access by other law.” 95
The ALI Restatement Draft describes a de facto parent as a third
party who establishes that they “lived with the child for a significant
period of time;” were “in a parental role” long enough that they
established “a bond and dependent relationship . . . parental in
nature;” they had no “expectation of financial compensation;” and “a
parent” consented to third party’s parental-like role. 96 So, the Draft,
but not the 2000 Principles, invites a childcare parentage designation
adversely impacting the childcare interests of an existing and
nonconsenting parent. 97
Before and since 2017, there exist state statutes and common law
precedents on nonmarital, nonbiological, and nonadoptive childcare
parentage similar to the suggested UPA and ALI de facto parent
norms. For example, before 2017 there were quite comparable Maine
and Delaware statutes 98 and a less comparable Wisconsin Supreme
Court precedent, 99 that the drafters of the 2017 UPA utilized. 100

94.
95.
96.
97.

98.
99.

same rights of notice, hearing or counsel as have natural parents in Juvenile Court
Law proceedings under due process or equal protection principles). The Reporter’s
Notes to the 2000 ALI Principles observes the “law that most closely approximates
the criteria for a ‘de facto’ parent relationship is that of Wisconsin” where visitation
(but not custody) may be awarded “to an individual who has formed a ‘parent-like
relationship’ with a child.” 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 2.03, cmt. c.
2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 59, § 2.09(2).
Id. § 2.09(4).
ALI Restatement Draft, supra note 82, § 1.72(a) (proof by “clear and convincing
evidence” is required).
The ALI Restatement Draft, like the 2017 UPA, on de facto parentage invites
substantive Due Process violations of the childcare interests of existing and
nonconsenting legal parents. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Unconstitutional Parenthood,
104 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 203–05 (2020); E.N. v. T.R., 255 A.3d 1, 41 (Md. 2021)
(requiring, for de facto parenthood consent by two existing legal parents, if there are
two, or a finding of unfitness in a nonconsenting parent or a finding of “exceptional
circumstances”).
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1891 (West 2022); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8201(c) (West 2022).
See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (parental-like
relationship can prompt visitation rights when in child’s best interests). There are
common law precedents elsewhere. In 2008 the South Carolina Supreme Court,
adopting a Wisconsin high court analysis, determined that a nonparent was eligible
for psychological parent status if a four-prong test was met. Marquez v. Caudill, 656
S.E.2d 737, 743–44 (S.C. 2008) (following H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435–36, which
set out norms for nonparent child visitation orders); see also Conover v. Conover, 146
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Since 2017, a few states have statutorily recognized 2017 UPA de
facto parenthood. 101
On occasion, statutes within a single U.S. state recognize both
residency/hold out and de facto parents who are neither biologicallytied to, nor formal adopters of, children. Thus the Maine Parentage
Act, effective in July 2016, provides for presumed parents who
resided since birth with a child for at least two years and “assumed
personal, financial, or custodial responsibilities,” 102 as well as
provides for de facto parents who, inter alia, resided with the child
“for a significant period of time,” established with the child “a
bonded and dependent relationship,” and “accepted full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent . . . without expectation of
financial compensation.” 103 Similarly, there are both residency/hold
out and de facto parents in Delaware, 104 Washington, 105 and
Vermont. 106
C. Irrational Differences
State law and ULC differentiations between residency/hold out
parentage and de facto parentage are puzzling. Most curious is the
2017 UPA provision recognizing that only a putative parent can seek

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

A.3d 433, 446–47 (Md. 2016) (using H.S.H.-K. in recognizing de facto parent
doctrine). And in 2009, a federal appeals court noted that the Mississippi Supreme
Court had long recognized that a person standing “in loco parentis,” meaning “one
who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption[,]”
has the same “rights, duties and liabilities” as a natural parent. First Colony Life Ins.
Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177, 183 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Farve v. Medders, 128 So.
2d 877, 879 (Miss. 1961)); By contrast, in some U.S. states where there are no de
facto parent statutes, courts choose not to develop precedents because any new de
facto parentage norms are the responsibility of state legislators. See, e.g., Parness,
supra note 9, at 479. For a forceful argument on the need for continuing the common
law “equitable parenthood doctrine” even where there are statutes, see Jessica
Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines
in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent
Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55 (2017).
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440 (West 2022); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15C, § 501 (West 2022).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1881(3) (West 2022).
Id. § 1891(3).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (West 2022) (presumed residency/hold out
parent); id. § 8-201(c).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.115(b) (West 2022) (presumed residency/holdout
parent “for the first four years”); id. § 26.26A.440 (de facto parent).
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 401(a)(1) (West 2022) (presumed residency/hold out
parent after the first two years); id. § 501(a)(1) (de facto parent).
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to establish de facto parent status, 107 though another 2017 UPA
provision recognizes that presumptive residency/hold out parenthood
“applies for all purposes” (presumably including child support),
where the person giving birth, the child, and the state can each seek
to establish parentage. 108 The differences in standing norms prompt
both Equal Protection (i.e., irrational distinction) and public policy
concerns. 109
IV. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION PARENT
A. Nonsurrogacy Parent
The 1973 UPA does not deal with the “many complex and serious
problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination.” 110 It does,
however, address “one fact situation that occurs frequently,” 111 a
“consent” by a husband to the artificial insemination of his wife with
“semen donated by a man not her husband.” 112 Here, the husband is
to be “treated in law as if he were the natural father” where the
consent was in writing and “signed by him and his wife,” with
certification undertaken and then filed by the supervising “licensed
physician” with state governmental officials. 113 The husband is a
nonpresumptive spousal parent. The semen donor who is not the
husband is to “be treated in law as if he were not the natural
father.” 114
In response to the increasing numbers of children born of assisted
reproduction, the 2017 UPA contains distinct articles on
nonsurrogacy and surrogacy births. In nonsurrogacy settings, the
2017 UPA “is substantially similar” to the 2000 UPA, with the
“primary changes . . . intended to update the article so that it applies
equally to same-sex couples.” 115 The 2017 UPA recognizes that a
sperm donor is not always a parent of a child conceived by assisted

107. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
108. Id. §§ 203, 602.
109. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Comparable Pursuits of Hold Out and De Facto Parentage:
Tweaking the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 31 J. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIM. LAWS 157,
157–58 (2018).
110. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 5(a).
113. Id. (stating that all papers and records pertaining to the insemination are to be kept
confidential, though subject to inspection pursuant to a court order “for good cause
shown”).
114. Id. § 5(b).
115. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §7 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
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reproduction. 116 For there to be two legal parents, a consent to
parentage must be signed by the person giving birth and “an
individual who intends to be a parent,” though the “record” need not
be certified by a physician. 117 Seemingly, “consent in a record” can
be undertaken “before, on, or after birth of the child.” 118 The lack of
this form of consent does not foreclose childcare parentage for an
intended parent where there is clear-and-convincing evidence of an
“express agreement” between the individual and the person giving
birth “entered before conception.” 119 As well, the lack of such
consent or agreement does not foreclose an individual’s parentage
where the child was held out as the individual’s own in the child’s
first two years. 120 The nonparental status of one married to a person
giving birth to a child born by assisted reproduction, even if a gamete
donor, may be established by showing a lack of consent, of any
agreement, and of holding out the child as one’s own. 121
The nonsurrogacy parentage norms in the UPAs are now reflected
in some U.S. state statutes 122 and in precedents untethered to
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. §§ 702–704.
Id. § 704(a).
Id. § 704(b).
Id. § 704(b)(1). It is clear why an “express agreement” undertaken postconception
does not prompt comparable childcare parentage. Here, there is much greater certainty
that a child will be born so that an agreement is far less speculative. Perhaps instead
of a postconception agreement, the 2017 UPA contemplated a prebirth VAP, as it
recognizes an “intended parent” can sign a VAP. Yet, an “intended parent” under the
2017 UPA in many states has no prebirth VAP access as the states follow the 1973
UPA or 2000 UPA which only authorize post-birth (paternity) VAPs. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (“paternity” acknowledgment “of the
child” in a “writing filed with” the state, which is not disputed by “the mother”);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002) (“man
claiming to be the genetic father of the child” signs together with the “mother of a
child”).
120. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); see, e.g., Jason P. v.
Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
121. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
122. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.7031 (West 2021) (stating fatherhood for unwed
man, intending to be father, who provides sperm to licensed physician and consents to
the use of that sperm for assisted reproduction by an unwed woman, where consent is
in a record signed by man and woman and kept by the physician); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 5-C:30 (2022) (stating unwed mother has sperm donor “identified on birth
record” where “an affidavit of paternity” has been executed); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 8-704 (West 2021) (“Consent by a woman and a man who intends to be a parent of
a child born to the woman by assisted reproduction must be in a record signed by the
woman and the man.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-904 (West 2021) (“Consent by a
woman and a man who intends to be the parent of a child born to the woman by
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statutes, 123 with significant interstate variations. 124 The 2017 UPA
provisions have been enacted in a few states. 125
Childcare parentage for those giving birth and intended parents in
nonsurrogacy settings often involve express consents. There could
be, but there generally are no, state-required forms guiding such
consents. In California, however, in nonsurrogacy settings there are
statutorily-recommended consent forms that may be used, but are not
required. 126 Suggested state-formulated consent forms should be
more generally available as informed consent would be better assured
and there would be greater certainty in factual disputes regarding
party intentions. 127 Such forms would be comparable to the generally
required forms for a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity

123.

124.

125.
126.
127.

assisted reproduction shall be in a record signed by the woman and the man. This
requirement shall not apply to a donor.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (West
2021) (“[P]erson who provides eggs, sperm or embryos for or consents to assisted
reproduction . . . with the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting
child.”).
See Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 39 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (holding to avoid
constitutional infirmity, assisted reproduction statute as written solely for married
opposite-sex couple applied to same-sex domestic partners); Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 798 (indicating explicitly a lack of paternity for this particular semen donor
when his unwed partner delivered a child conceived via assisted reproduction, the
statute on presumed parentage for one (either male or female) who receives a child
into the home and openly holds out the child as one’s own natural child can support –
in certain circumstances – legal paternity for the semen donor); Ramey v. Sutton, 362
P.3d 217 (Okla. 2015) (holding unwritten preconception agreement prompts in loco
parentis childcare status for former lesbian partner of birth mother, though she
contributed no genetic material); In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d
488, 501 (N.Y. 2016) (holding agreement between lesbian partners can prompt
parentage in non-birth mother).
See generally Deborah H. Forman, Exploring the Boundaries of Families Created
with Known Sperm Providers: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 19 UNIV. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 41 (2016) (explaining variations within the laws and their foundational
principles).
See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701–708 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); WASH
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.610 (West 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 701 (West
2018).
See CAL. FAM. CODE, § 7613.5 (West 2020) (indicating forms on assisted
reproduction pacts by two married or by two unmarried people, where signatories
may or may not have used their own genetic material to prompt a pregnancy).
See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Formal Declarations of Intended Childcare
Parentage, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 87 (2017). See, e.g., Jason P., 171 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 798 (informed consent form related to an in vitro fertilization, which listed
the sperm provider as an intended parent, was not a preconception “writing” granting
the provider “legal status as a parent”).
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(VAPs). 128 State-sanctioned forms on nonsurrogacy assisted
reproduction, compatible with a state’s laws on assisted reproduction,
would be especially helpful to do-it-yourselfers who otherwise, for
example, employ internet forms that will not later be recognized as
enforceable agreements. 129
As with presumed spousal parentage laws for children born of sex,
is there anything important added by employing terms like husband,
wife, man, and woman in nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction parent
laws? There are sperm and egg donors (not intended parents) and
providers (intended parents), as well as consenting, agreeing, and
residing individuals. How parents and nonparents are genderidentified, publicly or personally, should not impact legal analyses
implementing public policies on childcare parentage, whatever they
are.
B. Surrogacy Parent
As to surrogacy, the 1973 UPA is silent. 130 The 2017 UPA, like the
2000 UPA, distinguishes between genetic (“traditional”) and
gestational surrogacy. 131 Their surrogacy provisions are limited to
instances of assisted reproduction births. 132 Unlike its 2000
128. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards:
More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 63–87
(2010). At times, written parentage acknowledgments operating through stategenerated VAP forms were not utilized. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-909(a)(4)
(West 2021) (presuming that a man is the father of a child if he has “acknowledged
paternity in writing”); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-204(A)(4)(c) (West 2021)
(providing that a man is presumed to be the father of a child that “he promised in a
record to support . . . as his own” if he married the birth mother after the child’s
birth); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(a)(4) (West 2021) (providing that a man is
presumed to be the father of a child if he “notoriously or in writing recognizes
paternity of the child,” including but not limited to acts in accordance with the
voluntary acknowledgment statutes).
129. See, e.g., Gatsby v. Gatsby, 495 P.3d 996, 1005–06 (Idaho 2021) (inherent form
found seriously deficient).
130. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (addressing husband-wife
pacts on assisted reproduction where the wife bears the child and intends to parent,
but declining to “deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the
practice of artificial insemination”).
131. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 8 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
132. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002) (stating
in the surrogacy agreement that the perspective gestational mother “agrees to
pregnancy by means of assisted reproduction”); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(3)
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (stating in the surrogacy agreement that the pregnancy
“through assisted reproduction”). This is not to say there are no instances of surrogacy
undertaken through consensual sex. See, e.g., K.B. v. M.S.B., 2021 B.C.S.C 1283,
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predecessor, the 2017 UPA does not require all surrogacy agreements
to be validated by a court order prior to any medical procedures. 133
The 2017 UPA imposes differing requirements for the two surrogacy
forms, however, with “additional safeguards or requirements on
genetic surrogacy agreements,” 134 as only they involve a woman
giving birth while “using her own gamete.” 135 The 2017 UPA
recognizes there can be “one or more intended parents” in surrogacy
settings. 136
The common requirements for the two forms of surrogacy pacts
include signatures in a record, “attested by a notarial officer or
witnesses;” independent legal counsel for all signatories; and
execution before implantation. 137 Special provisions for gestational
surrogacy pacts include an opportunity for “party” termination
“before an embryo transfer” and an opportunity for a prebirth court
order declaring parentage vesting at birth. 138 Special provisions for
genetic surrogacy pacts include the general requirement that “to be
enforceable,” an agreement must be judicially validated “before
assisted reproduction” upon a finding that “all parties entered into the
agreement voluntarily” and understood its terms; 139 that a genetic
surrogate may withdraw consent “in a record” at any time before

133.
134.

135.

136.

137.

138.
139.

para. 2–3 (Can.) (involving a parentage action filed by surrogate against biological
father and spouse).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, pt. 2, cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
Id. § 8 cmt. The common safeguards or requirements for all surrogacy pacts are found
in Sections 802–807 of the 2017 UPA. Id. §§ 802–807; see also id. §§ 808–812
(special requirements for gestational surrogacy agreements); id. §§ 813–818 (special
requirements for genetic surrogacy agreements).
Id. § 801(1). Gestational Surrogacy covers birth by a woman who uses “gametes that
are not her own.” Id. § 801(2). The special rules for gestational surrogacy pacts are
found at §§ 808–812, while the special rules for genetic surrogacy pacts are found in
§§ 803–818. Id. §§ 803–818.
Id. § 801(3). The 2017 UPA does not address accidental surrogacy, as where there is a
“tragic mix-up at a fertility clinic through which a woman became a ‘gestational
mother’ to another couple’s embryo, when the embryo was mistakenly implanted into
the wrong woman’s uterus.” Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) (custody awarded to embryo creators, with no visitation for gestational
mother).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(6), (7), (9) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). Thus, by
definition, a person who may become pregnant through sex cannot agree to be a
surrogate, as cannot a person who is pregnant and only agrees to surrogacy post
pregnancy. Id. § 801(1)–(2) (applying each surrogacy form only to a person “who
agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction”).
Id. §§ 808(a), 811(a)(1).
Id. § 813(a)–(b).
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seventy-two hours after the birth; 140 and that a genetic surrogate
cannot be ordered by a court to “be impregnated, terminate or not
terminate a pregnancy, or submit to medical procedures.” 141
UPA surrogacy parentage norms are now reflected both in state
statutes 142 and precedents untethered to statutes. 143 Certain provisions
of the 2017 UPA have been enacted in a few states. 144 Elsewhere,
there operate major sections of the 2000 UPA on surrogacy. 145 As yet
there are no state-required forms, though there are suggested forms

140. Id. § 814(a)(2). However, genetic and gestational surrogates have both been
recognized as having federal constitutional parental opportunity interests. Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261–62 (1983). See generally In re Schnitzer, 493 P.3d
1071 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (holding mere genetic connections without more will not
automatically confer a constitutionally protected parental interest).
141. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 818(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
142. In New Hampshire, before insemination pursuant to a surrogacy contract will be
deemed “lawful,” a court “shall” be petitioned for “judicial preauthorization.” N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:16(I), 21(I) (2010) (repealed 2014). Requirements include
that the “intended mother [is] . . . psychologically unable to bear a child without risk
to her health or to the child’s health,” the “intended father . . . provided a gamete,”
and either the “intended mother or surrogate provided the ovum.” Id. § 168-B:17(II)–
(IV) (repealed 2014). Authorization is permitted only where the “surrogacy contract is
in the best interest of the intended child.” Id. § 168-B:23(III)(d) (repealed 2014).
143. There is legal precedent of judicial enforcement of surrogacy agreements. See, e.g., In
re F.T.R., 2013 833 N.W.2d 634, 653 (Wis. 2013) (enforcing surrogacy pact between
two couples as long as child’s best interests were served, while urging the legislature
to “consider enacting legislation regarding surrogacy” to ensure “the courts and the
parties understand the expectations and limitations under Wisconsin law”); In re
Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 812, 833 (Tenn. 2014) (“traditional surrogacy contracts do not
violate public policy as a general rule” where surrogate artificially inseminated with
sperm of intended father, who was not married to intended mother); In re Amadi A.,
No. W2014-01281-COA-R3-JV, 2015 WL 1956247, at *1– 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr.
24, 2015) (gestational surrogate for married couple is placed on birth certificate as
said to be required by statute where intended father’s/husband’s sperm used with egg
from unknown donor and intended mother/wife was recognized by all parties as legal
mother; reiterates plea from In re Baby that the legislature should enact a
comprehensive statutory scheme); Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 786–87 (Conn.
2011) (biological father’s male domestic partner can also be intended parent of a child
born to a gestational surrogate). Beyond enforcing a surrogacy pact in the absence of
statute, an intended parent (also the sperm donor) who employed a gestational
surrogate was allowed in one case to formally adopt his genetic offspring. See In re
John 103 N.Y.S.3d 541, 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
144. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.715 (West 2022) (gestational or genetic
surrogacy agreement); VT. STAT. ANN. 15C, § 801 (West 2021) (gestational carrier
agreements); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8.1-801 (West 2021) (gestational carrier
agreements).
145. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (West 2021) (similar to 2000 UPA).
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for nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction births in California.146
Increased mandates on required forms and the increased availability
of suggested forms would diminish significantly disputes over
consents to parentage, nonparentage, and conditions of pregnancy. 147
As with nonsurrogacy parenthood, the employment of terms in
statutes and cases like husband, wife, man, and woman add nothing
of public policy import to surrogacy parenthood laws. While
intentions are always key, additional requirements, such as the need
for spouses as intended parents, the need for two intended parents, or
the need for gamete donation(s) might be added (and might survive
constitutional attack). There is no reason to describe the surrogate or
any intended parents as male or female.
V. VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT PARENT
All UPAs recognize childcare parentage in those who have
undertaken a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (VAP) of a
child then alive. 148 The 2017 UPA also recognizes prebirth VAPs that
take effect at birth. 149 Unlike spousal parentage, with VAPs there are
actual consents to parentage. 150 Additional legal parentage
protections generally arise for those signing VAPs whose spouses
give birth (spousal parent).
The 1973 UPA recognizes “a man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child” if “he acknowledges his paternity in a writing” filed
with the state which is not disputed by the person giving birth “within
a reasonable time after being informed.” 151 Rebuttal of such a
presumption occurs only with “clear and convincing evidence of no
biological ties,” along with “a court decree establishing paternity of
the child by another man,” 152 with unclear limits on pursuing such a
rebuttal. 153

146. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5 (West 2020).
147. See Parness, supra note 127, at 104; see also Guardianship of Keanu, 174 N.E.3d
1228, 1230 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021) (recognizing the need for legislation given “the
risks of an informal surrogacy”).
148. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
149. Id. § 304(b)–(c).
150. See id. § 703.
151. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(5) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973).
152. Id. § 4(b).
153. Compare id. § 6(b) (regarding an action to determine the nonexistence of “the father
and child relationship” under the hold out/residency provision can be brought by “any
interested person”), with id. § 6(a) (stating an action to determine the nonexistence of
presumed marital father must be brought “within a reasonable time after obtaining
knowledge of relevant facts” but no “later than [five] years after the child’s birth”).
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The 2000 UPA recognizes no parentage presumption for a VAP
signor. 154 It does recognize that the person giving birth and “a man
claiming to be the genetic father of the child may sign an
acknowledgment of paternity with intent to establish the man’s
paternity.” 155 That UPA declares a VAP can be rescinded within 60
days of its effective date by a “signatory.” 156 Thereafter, a signatory
can commence a court case to “challenge” the VAP, but only on “the
basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact” within two years
of the VAP filing. 157
The 2017 UPA also recognizes nonpresumptive parent-child
relationships through VAPs. 158 Parentage establishments can be
undertaken by an expanded field of VAP signatories, including those
who claim to be “an alleged genetic father” of the child born of
sex; 159 a presumed parent due to an alleged or actual marriage; a
presumed parent due to a holding out of the child as one’s own while
residing in the same household with the child “for the first two years
of the life of the child[;]” 160 and, an “intended parent” in a
nonsurrogacy, assisted reproduction setting. 161 Under the 2017 UPA,
a VAP is the equivalent of an adjudication of the parentage of the
child. 162

154. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002).
155. Id. § 301. The accompanying Comment indicates that “a sworn assertion of genetic
parentage of the child” is needed though not “explicitly” required by federal welfare
subsidy statutes that often prompt state VAP laws, a federal statutory “omission” that
is corrected in the 2000 UPA. The Comment also recognizes a male sperm donor may
undertake a VAP in an assisted reproduction setting where his “partner” is the birth
mother. Id. § 301 cmt.
156. Id. § 307.
157. Id. § 308(a)(1).
158. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(5) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). Some marital parentage
presumptions, including marriages occurring after birth, can be prompted by
parentage assertions in records filed with the state. Id. § 204(a)(1)(C)(i).
159. Id. § 301.
160. Id. §§ 301, 204(a).
161. Id. §§ 301, 703. Unlike earlier UPAs, VAPs may be signed “before” birth. Id. §
304(b).
162. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302(a)(3) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). But cf. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-18-702(a)(1)–(3) (West 2021) (Within the Department of Health there is a
Putative Father Registry which can “entitle [signing] putative fathers to notice of legal
proceedings pertaining to the child for whom the putative father has registered.” But
the “rights” do not attach until the putative father establishes “a significant custodial,
personal, or financial relationship with the child[.]”).
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As with the 2000 UPA, per the 2017 UPA signatories may rescind
VAPs within 60 days of their effective date. 163 Challenges may
proceed thereafter, “but no later than two years after the effective
date” and “only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of
fact.” 164 While nonsignatory VAP challenges may be pursued within
“two years after the effective date of the acknowledgment,”
challenges usually will only be sustained when the child’s “best
interest” will be served. 165 Nonsignatory challengers are limited.
Those with standing include the child; a parent under the 2017 UPA;
“an individual whose parentage is to be adjudicated”; an adoption
agency; and a child support, or other authorized, governmental
agency. 166
The 2017 UPA expressly recognizes that VAPs may be undertaken
by those who know there are no biological ties to the children whom
they acknowledge. 167 This is new, and revolutionary. The 2017 UPA
allows circumvention of formal adoption laws and the safeguards
they provide for children, including background checks and best
interest findings. A comment to the 2000 UPA laments that the
federal statutes guiding state VAP laws do not expressly “require that
a man acknowledging paternity must assert genetic paternity”; it
indicates the 2000 UPA was “designed to prevent circumvention of
adoption laws by requiring a sworn statement of genetic parentage of
the child.” 168 Thus, in 2017, the ULC policy on VAPs changed
dramatically. The change not only runs counter to formal adoption
laws, but presents constitutional issues involving, at the least, asapplied challenges. 169
Many current state laws reflect the policies of the UPAs on
VAPs. 170 Only a few states have extended VAP authority to an
163. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 308(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). The effective date of a
VAP signed prebirth is the day the child is born. Id. § 304(c).
164. Id. § 309(a).
165. Id. § 610(b)(1)–(2).
166. Id. §§ 602, 610(b). Thus, the parents or siblings of an alleged biological father of a
child born of consensual sex seemingly cannot challenge a VAP.
167. See id. § 301 (recognizing intended parent for child born of assisted reproduction and
spousal parent, who is a presumed parent under § 204(a)(1)(A), like a woman married
to the birth mother).
168. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002).
169. Challenges would be founded on the innocent losses of the constitutional parental
opportunity interests of unwed sperm donors where children are born of consensual
sex to a person who is unwed. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248–49
(1983).
170. Alongside the aforedescribed UPA VAPs, some states also recognize parentage for
those who acknowledge parentage in other ways. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
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identified same-sex female couple where a child is born of
consensual sex. 171 VAP opportunities are not, and in many states
could not be, extended to an identified same-sex male couple where
one of the men conceived a child born of sex, at least where the
person giving birth continues to be a parent and where there cannot
be three legal parents. 172
State VAP statutes today only sometimes involve parentage
presumptions. With or without presumptions, 173 VAP statutes
typically recognize that signed and state-filed parentage declarations
establish childcare parentage for signors who are not persons giving
birth. Sometimes VAPs operate without alleged biological ties.174

171.

172.

173.
174.

257.55(c) (West 2021) (articulating that a man is presumed to be the biological father
of a child if he married the birth mother after the child's birth and “is obligated to
support the child under a written voluntary promise”).
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, §§ 301(a)(4), 401(a)(1) (West 2022) (stating that a
person married to the birth mother when child is born can undertake voluntary
parentage acknowledgment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.200 (West 2022)
(permitting birth mother and “presumed parent,” which includes spouse of birth
mother under 26.26A.115(1)(a)(i), to sign acknowledgment). Compare Jessica
Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary Acknowledgments of
Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 103 (2018)
(discussing the need for allowing VAPs for same-sex female couples who conceive
children using donated sperm), with Jeffrey A. Parness, Unnatural Voluntary
Parentage Acknowledgments Under the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 50 U. TOL. L.
REV. 25, 25–26 (2018) (addressing the problems with two women signing VAPs for
children born of consensual sex and concerns regarding lost paternity interests for
unwed biological fathers involving children born of consensual sex).
In California there can be three parents under law. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West
2022). But one such parent cannot be a parent via voluntary parentage
acknowledgment. See id. §§ 7611–7612(c) (voluntary parentage acknowledgment
does not prompt presumed parentage).
See Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More
and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 63–82
(2010) (reviewing state voluntary acknowledgment statutes).
In Alaska and Nevada, the VAP forms do not speak to biological ties, the signing man
indicates only that he is the “father.” See ALASKA BUREAU VITAL STAT., FORM NO. 065376 VS FORM 16, AFFIDAVIT OF PATERNITY (rev. Jan. 2009); NEVADA DECLARATION
OF PATERNITY, NEV. VITAL RECORDS, FORM NO. NSPO, DECLARATION OF PATERNITY
(rev. July 2008). In Vermont, a woman residing with a birth mother for the first two
years of a child’s life is eligible to sign a VAP. See VT STAT. ANN. tit. 15C §§
301(a)(4), 401(a)(4) (West 2022). In Wyoming and Washington, there is no explicit
requirement that the signing man affirm a belief in biological ties, though the signor
elsewhere is referred to as the “natural father.” See VITAL RECORDS SERVS., WYO.,
AFFIDAVIT ACKNOWLEDGING PATERNITY; WASH. PATERNITY AFFIDAVIT, CTR. FOR
HEALTH STAT., WASH. DEP’T OF HEALTH, FORM NO. DOH/CHS 021 (rev. Sept. 2007)
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VAPs operate without formal adoptions. State VAP laws also vary in
their disestablishment standards, though all norms, due to federal
welfare subsidy mandates, must conform to the federal Social
Security Act. 175
VAP statutes most often are employed by one giving birth and
another person who seeks to establish legal parenthood. 176 VAPs are
typically distinguished from birth certificate recognitions of childcare
parents encompassing those married to persons giving birth, who
frequently are presumed parents, but who never undertake VAPs. 177
VAP parents who also reside and hold out children as their own
differ from residency/hold out parents who never undertake VAPs,178
as a VAP is more difficult to challenge than is residency/hold out
parentage. 179
Only in some states must information as to any completed genetic
testing be submitted; may forms be used by residents for out-of-state

175.

176.
177.
178.
179.

(The foregoing VAP forms, and others later referenced, are on file with the author,
who assembled them while writing For Those Not John Edwards.).
See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 301–333, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). See Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part I.
Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 44–53, 82–
90 (2003) (discussing disestablishment, i.e., rescissions and challenges, including
table titled appendix B citing all statutes). Disestablishment norms can vary, for
example, depending upon whether a birth mother and male signatory must
acknowledge they are “biological parents.” Compare State ex rel. v. Smith, 392 P.3d
68, 79 (Kan. 2017) (no such acknowledgment in Kansas so no fraud when male
signatory has no biological ties, though VAP form establishes “paternity”), with
McGee v. Gonyo, 140 A.3d 162, 162–63, 167 (Vt. 2016) (In Vermont, where
“biological” parentage is acknowledged and where fraud as to belief in biological ties
can undo a VAP.).
But see In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 687–88, 692 (Surr. Ct. 2009) (suggesting
that a woman whose ova was used by her partner to bear a child born of assisted
reproduction might employ the voluntary acknowledgment process).
See, e.g., Castillo v. Lazo, 386 P.3d 839, 842 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that birth
certificate naming husband is “not equivalent to a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity”).
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C §§ 301(a)(4), 401(a)(4) (West 2022) (a presumed
hold out or residency parent may, but need not, sign a VAP).
For example, under both the 2000 and 2017 UPA a VAP usually cannot be challenged
more than 60 days after signing unless no more than two years have passed and there
is shown “fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 307–
308 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 308(a)(1),
309(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). For residency/hold out parentage, a proceeding “to
adjudicate the parentage of a child” having such a presumed parent must be
commenced within two years after a child’s birth, with no showing of fraud or the
like. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 607(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 608 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
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births; are witnesses or notaries needed; and must forms require
parental or guardian consent when the signing persons who gave
birth are young. 180 In Florida, besides a VAP, there is recognized a
paternity acknowledgment “in a sworn statement” by a man “after
learning that he is not the biological father of the child.” 181
Notwithstanding any statutorily-designated “conclusive” status,
VAPs can be rescinded by signatories within sixty days. 182 After
sixty days, VAPs can only be challenged in court on the basis of
fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. 183 For states participating in
federal welfare subsidy programs, these standards are required by the
federal Social Security Act. 184 Yet, state cases reflect significant
interstate variations in the fraud, duress, and mistake guidelines for
VAP challenges, with no Congressional or federal court movement,
as yet, to unify state VAP challenge standards. 185
Beyond fraud, duress, and mistake, there are other differences in
U.S. state VAP challenge laws. For example, there are varied time
limits on VAP challenges. Even with fraud, duress, or mistake,
challenges must be commenced within a year in Massachusetts, 186
within two years in Delaware, 187 and within four years in Texas. 188 In

180. See Parness & Townsend, supra note 128, at 63–87 (reviewing the varying state
forms).
181. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.18(3)(b), (f) (West 2021); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.10
(West 2021) (stating the law relevant to voluntary paternity acknowledgment).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii) (2018).
183. Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii).
184. See id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)–(iii). At least one state statute combines its norms on
disestablishing presumed marital paternity and its norms on challenging VAPs. See
ALA. CODE 26-17-608(a)(1) (2021).
185. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness & David A. Saxe, Reforming the Processes for
Challenging Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177
(2017) [hereinafter Reforming VAPs] (discussing the significant variations in federal
and state laws regarding voluntary paternity acknowledgment and proposing parental
acknowledgment separate from the restrictions of the Social Security Act for the
benefit of overall child welfare).
186. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 11(a) (West 2022). Kansas also has a statutory
one-year period. See State v. Smith, 392 P.3d 68 (Kan. 2017) (finding a one-year
(after birth) limit on signatory challenges applied though the court found technical
violations [e.g., no proper notarizations] of the statute).
187. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13, § 8-308(a)(2) (West 2022). Vermont also has a statutory twoyear period. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(a)(2) (West 2021). To see how other
states have handled complications arising from the running of this statutory period,
compare Paul v. Williamson, 322 P. 3d 1070 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) (employing
Oklahoma two-year limit against alleged biological father per OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §
7700-609(B) (2021)), with LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:406 eds. note to 2016 amendment
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Utah, a statutory challenge may be made “at any time” on the ground
of fraud or duress, but only within four years for a material mistake
of fact. 189 Where there are no written time limits, (often quite broad)
trial court discretion reigns. 190 Further, there are interstate differences
in whether a successfully challenged VAP eliminates past child
support arrearages. 191
Importantly, particularly for nonsigning sperm donors with
children born of consensual sex, there are some laws on the
circumstances beyond fraud, duress, and mistake available to
challenge VAPs. Consider challenges by nonsigning sperm donors
who did not know that others were signing VAPs alongside those
giving birth, and who did not know of, and did not reasonably
foresee, their “potential parentage.” In Vermont, such a sperm donor
may challenge a VAP within two years after discovery of “potential
parentage,” as in cases where there was “concealment” of the
pregnancy or of the birth though there was no fraud, duress, or
mistake. 192 Elsewhere, “concealment” of a pregnancy or of a live
birth by the person giving birth (and, at times, others) may not extend
the time for a sperm donor to challenge a VAP because strict repose
periods operate. 193
Finally, again particularly important for nonsigning sperm donors
(and their family members), state laws vary on which nonsignatories
can challenge VAPs. In Vermont, a challenge is available to “a
person not a signatory.” 194 Elsewhere, standing to challenge a VAP is
far more limited, as with laws recognizing only certain types of
challengers, like children and governments. 195

188.
189.
190.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

(2021) (repealing two-year prescriptive period previously imposed for revocation of
authentic acts of acknowledgment).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.607(a) (West 2021).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-307(3)–(4) (LexisNexis 2021).
See, e.g., In re Neal, 184 A.3d 90 (N.H. 2018) (affirming exercise of trial court
discretion where a 2009 VAP was challenged by male signatory in 2015 after a 2012
paternity test revealed that he was not the biological father and child contact was cut
off in 2014).
See generally Adler v. Dormio, 872 N.W. 2d 721 (Mich. App. 2015) (reviewing
Michigan laws on when responsibility for arrearages may be eliminated).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(b) (2021).
See, e.g., Reforming VAPs, supra note 185, at 199–200 (noting that VAP challenges
within the relevant time limits may be foreclosed by laches or estoppel).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(b).
See, e.g., Reforming VAPs, supra note 185, at 188–94 (reviewing state law on the
circumstances in which alleged biological father, the government, children, and
certain others may challenge VAPs). While the 2017 UPA expressly recognizes a
VAP may be challenged by a nonsignatory, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 309(b), 610(b)
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (“proceeding . . . brought by an individual other than the
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There are several constitutional problems with current VAP laws.
As to the gendered terms in VAP laws, what is added by describing a
signor as a mother or a woman, rather than as the person giving
birth? What is added by describing a signor as a father or a man, or as
a mother or a woman, rather than as an actual or possible gamete
provider, which would recognize the interests of both sperm and egg
providers where genetic ties are important? 196 By recognizing gamete
provision rather than sperm or egg provision, irrational distinctions
between donors who seek legal parenthood are eliminated. 197 VAPs
should encompass those who undertake voluntary parentage
acknowledgment, not voluntary paternity acknowledgment, a
distinction recognized in the 2017 UPA.198 Yet the 2017 UPA does
unfairly differentiate between an “alleged genetic father” who can
sign a VAP for a child born of sex to another and an alleged genetic
mother who cannot sign a VAP for a child delivered by another if she
has not undertaken a “record” of intent to parent a child born of
assisted reproduction. 199

196.
197.

198.
199.

child”), the 2002 UPA only explicitly recognizes signatory challenges, UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 308(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002). See also UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4(a)(5), 6(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (“Any interested party may
bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under [§ 4(a)(5)].”).
Herein, “gamete providers” encompass those intending to parent their biological
children born of assisted reproduction while “gamete donors” have no such intentions
when they donate.
On the need for VAP availability for egg providers, see, for example, Jessica
Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary Acknowledgments of
Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 99, 103–04, 104
n.19 (2018) (arguing that female couples who have children with donated sperm and
conceived through assisted reproduction should have legal parent status through
completion of a VAP). A set of more progressive laws is VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, §§
301(a)(4), 401(a)(1) (West 2022) (meaning a person married to one bearing a child
can undertake a VAP).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt., para. 2 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
Id. § 301 (recognizing the availability of VAPs for identified females but failing to
recognize expressly VAPs for such unmarried females who have contributed eggs
leading to children delivered by others). These egg providers also do not qualify as
intended parents of children born to their partners who delivered the children where
there is no effective consent. Id. § 704. For such consent, a “record” is needed, though
there may be actual consent. Id. § 704(a). In nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction
settings, the written “record” of consent must contain the signature of the person
giving birth and the other intended parent, and can be executed “before, on, or after
the birth of the child.” Id. § 704(b). In the absence of such a “record,” an individual
can prove “consent to parentage” by proving “by clear-and-convincing evidence the
existence of an express agreement entered into before conception” as to intended
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VI. DECEASED PARENT
On occasion, it is important to determine initially the legal
parentage of one who dies before or after the birth of an alleged
offspring or to disestablish an earlier parentage determination for one
now dead. The parental status of one who is deceased is important in
such matters as child support, inheritance, and personal injury. Those
interested in having a decedent’s parentage determined under law
include the person giving birth (as for unpaid child support from an
estate), the child (as for probate or tort recovery), the state (as for
child support reimbursement), and the decedent’s family members
(as for familial visitation).40
The laws on the parental status of one now deceased can, but need
not, vary by context. They can also distinguish between decedents
who passed away before conception, between conception and birth,
and after birth. The 2017 UPA demonstrates in its approach to the
“parental status of deceased individual” in nonsurrogacy assisted
reproduction settings. 200 As to intended parents who die
preconception after consenting in a “record” to assisted reproduction
with one who agrees to give birth, the decedent is a “parent” only if
the decedent either consented to post-death parentage “in a record” or
there is “clear-and-convincing” evidence of such an intent, as well as
if the embryo is in utero not later than 36 months after death or the
child is born not later than 45 months after death. 201 As to intended
parents who die between “the transfer of a gamete or embryo and the
birth of the child,” the decedent is a parent if the “individual
otherwise would be a parent under the UPA.” 202 As to the parentage
of spouses who die after their marital mates give birth via
nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction, parental status seemingly can
continue to be challenged if, before their death, the deceased spouses
commenced a proceeding to adjudicate parentage not later than two
parentage. Id. §704(b)(1). Where an egg provider cannot prove a preconception
express agreement, as when disputed by the person about to give or giving birth with
whom the provider is no longer partnered, and cannot then undertake a VAP, as the
former partner will not sign, the provider may seek an adjudication as a genetic parent
but may have to compete with another individual claiming parenthood with the person
who gave birth. Id. §§ 607, 613. By contrast to the “record” needed by an egg
provider, an “alleged genetic father” can undertake a VAP before birth, establishing
parentage effective at birth, without any other “record.” Id. §§ 201(5), 301, 304(b).
200. Id. §§ 701, 708.
201. Id. § 708(b). The Connecticut Parentage Act, effective in 2022, differs in that there
must be “a written document” on consent and the embryo is in utero not later than one
year after the decedent’s death. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58(b) (West 2021).
202. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 708(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 58(b).
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years after birth and the deceased spouses are found to not have
consented to the assisted reproduction. 203
Notwithstanding these provisions, the 2017 UPA recognizes that
laws outside the UPA might operate for some parentage proceedings
tied to nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction. Thus, it declares that the
Act “does not create, enlarge or diminish parental rights or duties
under law of this state” outside the Act. 204
A. Parents Who Die Before Birth
On prospective parents who die prepregnancy or during pregnancy,
dead spouses of those later giving birth can be recognized as the
parents of the marital children, as where spousal parentage arises for
one married to the person giving birth at the time of conception or
during the pregnancy. This opens the door post-birth to such interests
as child support, child heirship in probate, child tort recovery, and
family status for the decedent’s family members in child visitation
matters. 205 When one giving birth is unwed, here too there can be
post-birth parenthood for the dead, as when a decedent’s sperm or
eggs were involved in the birth and where the decedent qualifies
under assisted reproduction laws as an intended parent or qualifies as
a prebirth VAP signor.
Parenthood for the dead usually does not, and should not, depend
upon the decedent’s gender identity. Unfortunately, too often
gendered terms are employed when assessing parentage for the dead,
making correct legal applications more difficult (as, e.g., equality
claims must be presented to secure comparable treatment of selfidentified men and self-identified women whose spouses give birth
where spousal parentage laws are only written for opposite-sex
couples).

203. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). The two-year period does
not apply in certain settings (no gamete or consent, no cohabitation with the birth
giver since the probable time of assisted reproduction, and no hold out of the child as
the spouse's own). Id. § 705(b); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57.
204. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 103(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). The 2022 Connecticut
Parentage Act has a similar declaration, but it also says the Act does not impact “the
equitable powers of the courts.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3(b) (West 2021). The
2017 Uniform Parentage Act provision on the parental status of a deceased individual
was written to conform to the UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(f), (k). UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 708, cmt., para. 3.
205. Est. of Swift ex rel. Swift v. Bullington, 309 P.3d 102, 106 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013)
(involving putative paternal grandfather who could pursue parentage action after son’s
death which preceded child’s birth).
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There are very few child support cases on the parentage of persons
who die before their children are born (via either consensual sex or
assisted reproduction). A much-cited survey of American state laws
says this of nonmarital children born after their sperm donors’ deaths:
Although statutes in most states now provide for the
survivorship of many causes of action and, while the
statutes vary widely in their provisions, some at least go so
far as a sweeping provision that all causes of action survive
the death of either the person in whom the cause is vested or
the person liable, nevertheless the courts are in substantial
agreement that, absent a statute expressly providing for the
survival of a cause of action, or of an action, to establish
paternity and support of an illegitimate child, neither the
right of action nor an action already instituted survives the
death of the putative father, so that no new filiation
proceeding can be instituted against the decedent’s estate,
and an existing action which has not reached judgment
abates and cannot be continued against decedent’s personal
representative. This reluctance to extend the support
obligation beyond the death of the parent extends to the
situation where the support order was entered during the
father’s lifetime, the courts usually holding that payment of
accrued obligations may be enforced against the estate but
that no further payments accrue after the father’s death. 206
If parental death ends child support for a living child, it should end
child support for an unborn child. The survey does suggest, however,
that continuing child support may be available from a decedent’s
estate when there is “a contract for support, secured, if possible, by
an insurance policy or trust fund.” 207
The survey fails to recognize that persons other than “fathers” can
be responsible for child support, both prebirth and post-birth.208
There is now spousal parentage arising from marriages of couples
who are not identified and who do not identify as husbands and
wives. Further, the survey fails to recognize there can be nonspousal

206. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Death of a Putative Father as Precluding Action for
Determination of Paternity or for Child Support, 58 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 188, § 2(a)
(1974).
207. Id. § 2(b).
208. Id. § 1(a) (limiting the scope of the annotation to the death of a putative father).
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parentage for persons other than those who can be assigned
“paternity” status, as with some assisted reproduction births. 209
The general unavailability of child support for a child born after a
prospective parent’s death does not foreclose the child from other
monetary recoveries founded upon a prospective parent’s death,
including relief under tort, probate, or insurance laws. Thus, there
might be, for example, post-birth parentage actions following the
deaths of biological, spousal or intended parents before or during
pregnancies. Here, marital and nonmarital children could be treated
alike. 210
There are, in fact, some money recovery cases, beyond child
support, on the parentage of those who die before their children’s
births. Again, gendered terms prompt difficulties. For example, in
tort there is the wrongful death claim which can usually be pursued
when the death of an individual is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another. 211 Here, the decedent’s personal representative
maintains an action on behalf of the decedent against whomever
caused the death if the decedent, had the decedent lived, could have
maintained a comparable action. 212 Damages recovered for medical,
hospital, funeral, and burial expenses inure to the exclusive benefit of
the decedent’s estate. The remainder of the damages, if any, often
inure to the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, to the
dependent children, or to the dependent’s next of kin. This remainder
is distributed in the same manner as the personal property of the
decedent. For such a claim, a child of the decedent whenever
conceived, but unborn prior to the decedent’s demise, can be a
dependent eligible to receive all or a portion of the remainder
damages. 213
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 3538 (West 2022) (“Except as herein
otherwise provided, a person born out of wedlock shall have the same rights in an
estate and shall be subject to such time limitations and to such procedures as are
applied to any other heir or claimant against an estate.”).
211. Wrongful-Death Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A lawsuit
brought on behalf of a decedent’s survivors for their damages resulting from a tortious
injury that caused the decedent’s death.”).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., First Student, Inc. v. Est. of Meece, 849 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (Ind. App. 2006)
(applying IND. CODE ANN. § 34-23-1-1 (West 2021) which includes as possible
claimants “dependent children”); Baez v. Rosenburg, 949 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ill. App.
2011); Garza v. Maverick Market, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. 1989) (allowing
illegitimate, posthumous child to sue for the wrongful death of his alleged father). The
unborn may need to have viability. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d
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As with child support laws, wrongful death laws unnecessarily
reference gender identity. For example, the Mississippi Code
references actions by “the widow, husband, child, father, mother,
sister or brother of the deceased or unborn quick child[.]” 214 The
Washington Code references “a parent or legal guardian who has
regularly contributed to the support of his or her minor child[.]”215
The Louisiana Civil Code references surviving fathers, mothers,
brothers, sisters, grandfathers, and grandmothers. 216
Beyond child support and tort, there are money recovery cases in
probate. For example, in Nebraska, if a man dies without a will but
with a surviving spouse, part of his estate passes to his “issue,”
defined as “all his . . . lineal descendants of all generations,” but only
includes a child who “survives the decedent by one hundred twenty
hours,” which includes a child conceived before the decedent’s death
but born thereafter. 217
In Maryland, a statute says: “[a] child of the decedent who is
conceived before the death of the decedent, but born afterward shall
inherit as if the child had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.”
218
This is a more sensible statute than in Nebraska. 219 Further, in
Maryland when a surviving spouse is inseminated after a spouse’s
death with the decedent’s “genetic materials,” the intestate
succession law says:
No other after-born relation may be considered as entitled to
distribution in the relation’s own right unless:
(1) The decedent had consented in a written record to use of
the decedent’s genetic material for posthumous
conception . . .

214.
215.
216.
217.

218.
219.

712, 724 (Ariz. 1985) (viable, stillborn fetus is a “person” under the state wrongful
death statute).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (West 2022) (spouse and sibling would prompt same
result).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010(1) (West 2022).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2 (West 2021).
Amen v. Astrue, 822 N.W.2d 419, 421–22 (Neb. 2012) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30-2303, -2304, -2308, -2209(23) (West 2021)) (noting these statutes, under
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 556 U.S. 541 (2012), mean the child can also not
recover a surviving child’s insurance benefits under federal Social Security laws).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(a) (West 2021).
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2304, -2308 (West 2021) (declining to
recognize statutory recognition of heirs conceived posthumously with decedent’s
genetic material), with EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b) (allowing steps taken prior to
decedent’s death to permit recognition of posthumously conceived children with
decedent’s genetic material).
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(2) The decedent consented in a written record to be the
parent of a child posthumously conceived using the
person’s genetic material; and
(3) The child posthumously conceived using the decedent’s
genetic material is born within 2 years after the death of
the decedent. 220
By a contrast, in Utah there is a problematic statute which says:
If a spouse dies before placement of . . . sperm . . . the
deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless
the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse
would be a parent of the child. 221
These days a deceased spouse can prompt birth through donated eggs
as well as through donated sperm. 222
For parentage in those who die before childbirth, the employment
of gender-neutral terms often would not undermine, but would in fact
promote the public policies benefitting children and their families.
Gender-neutral laws would respect individual gender identifications
having nothing to do with legal parenthood.
Rationality goals also suggest a need for the coordination of the
child benefit laws in varying deceased parent settings like tort,
insurance, and probate. Consistency would better promote the
relevant public policies. Children are not less financially needy in
support settings than in tort, insurance, or probate settings, when their
parents die before their birth. Rationality goals also dictate that the
varying monetary recovery laws benefitting a child who is born after
the demise of a parent respect the earlier noted changes in childcare
parent laws, including those recognizing parenthood founded on
consent to parenthood in and outside of assisted reproduction. As
stated in the 2017 UPA, “a parent-child relationship established”
under a parentage act “applies for all purposes, except as otherwise
provided . . . by law,” with any deviations, of course, needing to meet
rationality standards. 223
220. EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107(b).
221. See id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (West 2021).
222. See generally Kristine S. Knaplund, Reimagining Postmortem Conception, 37 GA. ST.
UNIV. L. REV. 905 (2021) (reviewing American state laws on child inheritance in
postmortem conception settings and finding “a bewildering array of standards”).
223. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 203 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
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B. Parents Who Die After Birth
When an alleged parent dies after the birth of a child, parenthood
can still be initially established. Thus, in child support, tort, and
probate settings, a child can recover monetarily upon establishing for
the first-time parentage in one who died during the child’s life. Here
there are far more eligible alleged parents than when alleged parents
die before their childrens’ births; in post-birth parentage death
settings parentage can arise due to post-birth acts, like holding
out/residency or de facto parenthood.
As to child support, one state high court allowed a post-death
parentage determination for a child born of sex, a ruling with much
sense. 224 In June 2008, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
found a trial court could enter a support order benefitting a
nonmarital child after the biological father died. 225 The nonmarital
child, Jaclyn, was born to L.M. in October 1992, with a VAP by
J.M.M. in 1993 and a birth certificate recognition of J.M.M. as a
parent at the time of Jaclyn’s birth. 226 Though J.M.M. never married
L.M., and married another woman after Jaclyn’s birth, J.M.M always
financially supported Jaclyn and included her on a life insurance
policy and in a will. 227 After J.M.M. died in 2006, L.M. successfully
obtained a future child support order on behalf of Jaclyn against the
executor of J.M.M.’s estate. 228 The court noted that had there been a
child support order entered before J.M.M.’s death, it would have
been enforceable against his estate after his death. 229 The court
observed that to deny post-death child support where parentage is not
disputed would have the potential of adversely affecting the financial
stability of children, as well as discourage parents from “attempting
to resolve support issues amicably and without resort to court
intervention which can fast assume one’s resources.” 230 While under
the federal Social Security Act a VAP now has the “legal finding of
paternity,” 231 such an effect is not always the same as the effect of a
paternity court judgment founded on genetic testing. 232
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

L.M. v. R.L.R., 888 N.E.2d 934, 935 (Mass. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 936–37.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 939.
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii) (2018).
See, e.g., Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 991, 994 (7th Cir. 2016) (indicating that a
VAP differs from an actual court judgment after a hearing in international child
relocation settings that are governed by a Hague Convention).
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As to torts, post-death parentage determinations are sometimes
required in statutory wrongful death/survival actions. There, an
alleged parent has died as a result of the wrongful act or omission of
another; the parentage of a child has not yet been determined legally
(as is often the case with a nonmarital child whose biological parent
dies not long after the child’s birth); and a surviving child of the
decedent, upon proof of parentage, can recover for his or her own
losses, as well as possibly receive additional money, including
survival action damages recovered by the decedent’s estate via
intestate succession laws (benefitting a surviving child of a decedent
who died without a will). In Alaska, when a man dies as a result of
the “wrongful act or omission of another,” the decedent’s personal
representative may sue the wrongdoer under a single statute
“exclusively for the benefit of the decedent’s spouse and children, or
other dependents.” 233 Damages can cover “loss of contributions for
support,” “loss of consortium,” and “loss of prospective training or
education,” as well as “medical and funeral expenses.” 234 Thus,
damages go for injuries incurred by the decedent prior to death, like
hospital bills where recovery goes to the decedent’s estate, as well as
for injuries incurred by the decedent’s child after death, like the loss
of prospective training and education. While the Alaska statute does
not define “children,” in a comparable Delaware wrongful
death/survival setting, there is only a remedy for certain nonmarital
children, including children whose parentage by a deceased parent
has been “judicially determined” or where parentage was
acknowledged or “openly and notoriously recognized” by the
decedent before the decedent’s death. 235 In Idaho, a deceased man’s
“illegitimate child” is only included in the wrongful death statute if
“the father has recognized a responsibility for the child’s support.”236
Thus, biological ties alone may not support wrongful death claims for
all alleged biological children of deceased parents whose estates
recover on survival claims. By contrast, in Washington stepchildren

233. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.580(a) (West 2021). Similar are OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30.020(1) (West 2021) and N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28A-18-2(a) (West 2021).
234. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.580(a).
235. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724(f) (West 2022). Somewhat comparable is Greenfield
v. Daniels, 51 So. 3d 421, 426, 429 (Fla. 2010) (holding that a child born into an
intact marriage may recover in a survival action for the death of a non-marital
biological father who “acknowledged responsibility for support”).
236. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-311(2)(b) (West 2021).
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are included as “beneficiaries” in the wrongful death statute. 237 And
in Arizona, stepchildren may recover as beneficiaries in a wrongful
death action if they can show the decedent stood “in loco
parentis.” 238
There are sometimes separate wrongful death and survival statutes.
In Louisiana, under one statute the “surviving spouse and child or
children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or
children,” can pursue a survival action on behalf of an injured person
who dies, where any recovery inures to the decedent’s estate and is
“heritable.” 239 A second statute recognizes a wrongful death claim on
behalf of certain persons for damages they personally sustained as a
result of the death of another. 240 Claimants include the surviving
child or children of the deceased. 241 Post-death parentage
determinations are quite sensible here. 242
A 2014 Mississippi Supreme Court decision demonstrates statutory
language can prompt differences in applying varying death statutes
covering injury claims. 243 In it, an “in loco parentis child” was
deemed ineligible for recovery for the wrongful death of a parent,
although such a child could recover under either the workers’
compensation statute or the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act. 244 Such distinctions do not seem
rational.
237. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.020 (West 2021), construed in In re Est. of Blessing,
273 P.3d 975, 979, ¶¶ 19–20 (Wash. 2012) to include the stepchildren of a woman
who died after the stepchildren's biological father died.
238. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(d)(2) (West 2021); cf. Zulpo v. Blann, 2013 Ark. App.
750, at *2 (2013) (implying stepchildren are covered by the language of § 16-62-102,
but holding only that the stepchildren did not prove they stood in loco parentis).
239. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.1 (West 2021).
240. Id. art. 2315.2(A). See also Est. of Panec v. Panec ex rel. Panec, 864 N.W.2d 219, 225
(Neb. 2015) (noting that wrongful death and survival claims are “distinct” though
they are “frequently joined in a single action” by a decedent’s personal
representative).
241. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2(A) (West 2021).
242. There are comparable post-death parentage settings akin to, but distinct from, torts.
For example, post-death parentage determinations are required in cases where there is
a need to decide whether a non-marital child of a deceased worker is entitled to
workers’ compensation benefits. See, e.g., Uninsured Emp.’s Fund v. Bradley, 244
S.W.3d 741, 742, 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). See also Doe ex rel. Rodriguez v. County
of Los Angeles, 2021 WL 1627486, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (involving a federal law
claim for child’s loss of alleged parent caused by defendants that was sustained where
there was proof of the decedent’s “ongoing involvement” and “participation in childrearing activities”).
243. Est. of Smith v. Smith ex rel. Rollins, 130 So. 3d 508, 512, 515 (Miss. 2014).
244. Id. at 511–12. The wrongful death statute only referenced the children’s “blood”
parents or adoptive parents, not “in loco parentis” parents. Id. at 512 (citing MISS.
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Where wrongful death legislation does not expressly address child
recoveries for parental deaths, judicial precedents can recognize such
claims. Thus, in Connecticut, an executor or administrator of an
estate may recover “just damages” from one “legally at fault” for
“injuries resulting in death.” 245 This has been read to allow “filial
consortium” claims for children arising from parental deaths. 246
As to probate, state laws vary on whether when a person dies
without a will, some or all of the estate can pass to a biological, or
nonbiological, nonmarital child who was never formally adopted.247
In California, a child can pursue estate distribution by providing clear
and convincing evidence that the decedent “openly held out the child
as his own,” even if “grudgingly” and even if the decedent would not
have wanted the child to inherit. 248 A child in California whose
sperm-related parent dies intestate may not be able to recover from
an estate if the parent had not “openly” held out the child as one’s
own. 249 In Tennessee, a nonmarital child may be able to recover in
the event of an intestate biological father’s death as the statute
requires only clear and convincing proof of “paternity.” 250 In an

245.
246.

247.

248.
249.

250.

CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (West 2021)). The other two laws explicitly referenced in loco
parentis children. Id. (referring to the Workers’ Compensation statute, MISS. CODE
ANN. § 71-3-3 (West 2021), and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902(14) (2018)).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555(a) (West 2021).
See Campos v. Coleman, 123 A.3d 854, 857, 869, 869 n.19 (Conn. 2015). The statute
has been extended to parental consortium claims for injured children. Lynch v. State,
No. HHDCV166067438, 2021 WL 4520325, at *48–50 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2021).
See generally Alexis C. Mejia, Comment, A Piece of You and I: Posthumous
Conception and Its Implications on Texas Estates Law, 13 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP.
L.J. 509, 515–26 (2021) (reviewing laws on the effects of posthumous conception on
heirship in probate proceedings involving intestate decedents). In Illinois, when a selfidentified or publicly identified man dies with a will, nonmarital children born of sex
can challenge the will even where the children were earlier adopted by the spouse of
the person giving birth. In re Est. of Snodgrass, 784 N.E.2d 431, 432 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003).
Est. of Burden, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 391, 394, 396 (Ct. App. 2007) (inheritance
statute allows parenthood to be established via unrebutted presumption of parent and
child relationship under Uniform Parentage Act).
Est. of Britel, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321, 324 (Ct. App. 2015). In California, the wrongful
death statute incorporates the probate statute’s definition of a child when an alleged
parent dies intestate. See, e.g., Stennett v. Miller, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872, 880 (Ct. App.
2019).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (West 2021) (a similar paternity finding is not
made when the nonmarital child dies intestate and the biological father or his
“kindred” seek to inherit); see also Est. of Walton v. Young, 950 S.W.2d 956, 958–60
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Alabama case, a child could not recover from an intestate biological
father’s estate where the child already had a presumed father under
law (here, a husband) who had not disclaimed his paternity. 251
Probate laws on parentage sometimes differ, rather surprisingly,
from childcare laws on parentage. In Georgia, though there may have
been no presumed childcare parentage in a spouse because there were
no biological ties, that spouse’s parentage for estate distribution
purposes could be established posthumously via that spouse’s
“virtual adoption” of the natural child of the spouse who gave
birth. 252 Similarly, in Illinois there is equitable adoption in probate,
but not in childcare. 253
Relatedly, in a veteran’s benefits case, a federal court found that
the governing agency regulation required “a biological relationship”
between the deceased veteran and the child in order for the child to
recover from the deceased veteran’s estate. 254 Here, evidently, the
death of a veteran, who was a de facto or presumed parent on equal
footing with the birth mother in childcare and child support settings
under state law, would not prompt a recognition of a parental loss for
the child for federal veteran benefit purposes. 255
It is less common, but true, that parentage for the dead, who passed
after the birth of their children, can be determined on behalf of those
who are not the decedents’ living children and who do not seek
money. Consider, for example, an alleged dead parent’s living
parents who seek grandparent visitation orders. While an alleged
grandparent may not be able to pursue a parentage action on behalf of
the deceased parent, since any such claim usually abates upon a
parent’s death, 256 standing for a grandparent under a child visitation

251.
252.
253.

254.
255.
256.

(Tenn. 1997) (demonstrating the need for “clear and convincing” evidence of
paternity).
Swafford v. Norton, 992 So. 2d 20, 29 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
Sanders v. Riley, 770 S.E. 2d 570, 571, 577 (Ga. 2015) (even where the child had
developed, later in her life, a relationship with her biological father).
Compare DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 103 (Ill. 2013) (probate), with In re
Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 792 (Ill. 2015) (childcare). On the contours of equitable
adoption in probate, see, for example, In re Est. of North Ford, 200 A.3d 1207, 1215
(D.C. 2019) (holding the child must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
decedent who died intestate “objectively and subjectively stood in the shoes” of a
parent).
McDowell v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 207, 212–13 (2009), aff’d, 396 Fed. Appx. 691
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
See id. at 209, 216.
See, e.g., Bullock v. J.B., 725 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Neb. 2006) (concluding that paternal
grandmother could not continue her son’s earlier paternity action after his death,
which she desired in order to be eligible for grandparent visitation orders).
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statute opens the door to an initial determination of legal parentage,
which could then prompt grandparent visitation. The availability of
such parentage determinations is wise, as the children are always
protected since any nonparent visitation order depends upon a finding
of the best interests of the child.
As with monetary recovery laws for children that are tied to
parental deaths before the children’s births, similar monetary
recovery laws tied to parental deaths after the children’s births, and
nonmonetary laws as with nonparent visitations, should not be
founded on gender identification requisites. If biological ties are key,
they can be proven without proof of how people are genderidentified, in the community or by themselves.
More importantly, post-birth parental death laws should often
reflect the earlier noted new childcare parent laws, 257 whether
founded on parental-like acts or on consents to parenthood in and
outside of assisted reproduction. Such reflections would promote
consistencies in public policies on who are parents and how are
children to be supported. What rationales support allowing a grieving
child to recover wrongful death, but not worker’s compensation,
benefits? There are no rationales that support not allowing one to
equitably adopt a child so as to have childcare interests and child
support duties, with the blessing of the child’s single parent, but
allowing the same child to recover from the one’s estate via an
equitable adoption doctrine? Even if there are separation of powers
concerns, should they not comparably apply in probate and in family
relation cases? 258
C. Parents Who Die Before or After Birth
A statute on post-death parentage determinations can apply
whether the putative parent’s death occurred before or after a child’s
birth. In Indiana, a statute says:
257. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
258. But see In re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d at 795 (recognizing judicial precedent on
equitable adoption in probate and rejecting equitable adoption in childcare; but the
court noted that while the justices “are not unsympathetic to the position” of the
alleged equitable adoption parent seeking childcare, “[l]egal change . . . must be the
product of policy debate that is sensitive not only to the evolving reality of ‘nontraditional’ families and their needs, but also parents’ fundamental liberty interest
embodied in the superior rights doctrine”). Of course, judicial recognitions of
childcare interest need not necessarily follow precedents on children in probate
because only in the former setting are superior parental caretaking rights implicated.
See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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(b) For the purpose of inheritance (on the paternal side) to,
through, and from a child born out of wedlock, the child
shall be treated as if the child’s father were married to
the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth, if:
(1) The paternity of the child has been established by law
in a cause of action that is filed:
(A) During the father’s lifetime; or
(B) Within five (5) months after the father’s death . . . . 259
In an inheritance case against an estate brought on behalf of a child
born about eight months after an alleged father’s death, an Indiana
appeals court dismissed. 260 It reasoned that a legitimate governmental
interest supported the statute; the state’s interest was the just and
orderly disposition of property of decedents. 261 Yet the court noted
that the same child may recover “attendant benefits” arising from
parental death, including “social security survivor benefits, employee
death benefits, and even proceeds of life insurance policies” since
they “do not pass by way of inheritance.” 262 Evidently, just and
orderly dispositions of these other benefits are not as important.
Rational?
D. Disestablishing the Parentage of the Dead
Parentage issues for the dead can involve post-death
disestablishment of earlier legal parenthood as well as initial
establishment of legal parenthood. Thus, sometimes in a probate
setting, a family member will attempt to rebut a marital parentage
presumption of a deceased spouse so that children born to the
surviving spouse during marriage will be unable to recover from the
decedent’s estate as surviving children. 263 Comparably, in an
insurance setting, a VAP by a decedent might be subject to a post-

259. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7(b)(2) (West 2021). Where a child is “born after the father
[has] died,” today the child has eleven months after death to establish paternity in a
cause of action. Id. § 29-1-2-7(b)(3).
260. S.V. v. Est. of Bellamy, 579 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
261. Id. at 147.
262. Id. at 148 & n.6.
263. See, e.g., Jarke v. Mondry, 958 N.E.2d 730, 736 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (disallowing a
sister from challenging the male parentage of her brother arising from a marital
presumption; the court recommended the legislature give “serious consideration” to
the purposes of the common law marital presumption, including protecting a child’s
inheritance rights, especially “where one sibling is trying to eliminate another
sibling’s inheritance”).
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death rescission request. 264 And in a probate setting, one child might
challenge the presumed nonmarital, non-VAP parentage presumption
(e.g., residency/hold out) favoring another child. 265
VII. GRIEVING PARENT
Not only may yet unrecognized parents die before or after the
births of their children, or may the parenthood of a child be
disestablished after the one-time parent’s death, but children may die
before a parent or parents are recognized under law, or before
recognized parenthood can be disestablished. How can parenthood be
established or disestablished in a deceased child, and for what
purposes? Wrongful death and probate cases come to mind. Here, the
policies generally should align with the policies underlying childcare
parentage. All those who possess care, custody and control of
children should be recognized as grieving parents when their children
die. Grieving childcare parents should not be differentiated by
whether they are biologically-tied or were married to those who gave
birth.
In the tort case of Caldwell v. Alliance Consulting Group, Inc., a
New York appellate division reviewed a ruling by the Workers’
Compensation Board. 266 The case involved the death of a son born to
Elsie and Leon Caldwell, a married couple, in February, 1971. 267 The
son died at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. 268 Leon
had earlier left Elsie and their two sons behind in Philadelphia when
he moved to New Jersey in September, 1972. 269 Thereafter, Leon had
contact with his deceased son on only two occasions. 270 There was an
overnight visit with Leon when his son was six. 271 And Leon saw his
son, but did not speak, when they both attended the funeral of Elsie’s
mother in January, 1984. 272 Court records showed Leon likely
264. But see Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 771 F.3d 387, 389–90 (7th Cir. 2014) (providing
that under Illinois law, a decedent’s sister cannot challenge the decedent’s
acknowledgment of a six-and-a-half-year-old in an insurance benefits dispute, which
is “a probate case in effect”).
265. See, e.g., Est. of Murray v. Slaughter, 344 P.3d 419, 424 (Nev. 2015) (rejecting
challenge as untimely, as standing was lost three years after child who was challenged
“reached the age of majority”).
266. Caldwell v. All. Consulting Grp., 775 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 2004).
267. Id. at 94 (Lahtinen, J., dissenting).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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rejected Elsie’s suggestions that he spend more time with his sons.273
After Elsie obtained a court order for child support, Leon failed to
make payments, with arrearages in excess of $20,000. 274 For a time,
Elsie received public assistance to support her two sons.275
Reimbursement from Leon, evidently, was not sought. Elsie raised
her sons alone. 276 The son who died “was a college graduate with an
ostensibly successful career.” 277
Because the deceased son was unmarried and had no dependents,
Elsie filed a claim for a $50,000 death benefit under New York
Workers’ Compensation Law. 278 Upon his intervention in Elsie’s
case, Leon was awarded $25,000. 279 The relevant statute declared
that the decedent’s death benefit “shall be paid to the deceased’s
surviving parents.” 280 Four of the five appellate court judges ruled
that when a term as “parent” does not have “a controlling statutory
definition and is clear and unambiguous,” the term should be given
its “usual and commonly understood meaning.” 281 They looked to a
legal dictionary, finding parent often means “the natural father or the
natural mother.” 282 Since Leon’s parental rights were never
terminated, the four judges found that Leon survived his deceased
son. 283 They did recognize that in other statutory settings, as in
probate 284 and wrongful death, abandoning parents were expressly
disqualified by statutes as surviving parents, though their parentage
was recognized earlier. 285 There was no such explicit provision in the
New York Workers’ Compensation Law. 286
The one dissenting judge not only looked to different dictionary
descriptions, but also undertook a different mode of statutory
analysis, using the axiom that “the legislature is presumed to have
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 93 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., In re Est. of Ball, 807 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (App. Div. 2005) (citing N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4(a) (Consol. 2022) in support of denying share of
estate to abandoning parent); In re Est. of Arroyo, 710 N.Y.S.2d 492, 493 (App. Div.
2000) (citing EST., § 4-1.4(a) in support of denying share of wrongful death settlement
to abandoning parent).
285. Caldwell, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
286. Id.
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intended to do justice, unless its language compels the opposite
conclusion.” 287 The dissenter determined that justice required there
be no award to “those who abandon their obligations to their
children,” a determination supported by the “public policy” expressly
articulated in probate and other wrongful death settings, as well as in
“common sense.” 288 In a later case, this ruling was followed as the
court found a “need for the Legislature, and not this Court, to remedy
the perceived inconsistency and/or inequity.” 289 Irrationality under
Equal Protection was not addressed.
A different approach is taken for other New York statutory claims,
as recognized in Caldwell. The Caldwell ruling was distinguished in
a case involving the assets of a deceased child who died without a
will. 290 There, an abandoning legal father received no share of the
estate, as the New York Estate Powers and Trust Law provided:
No distributive share . . . [s]hall be allowed to a parent who
has failed or refused to provide for, or has abandoned . . .
child . . . under the age of twenty-one years . . . unless the
parental relationship and duties are subsequently resumed
and continue until the death of the child. 291
The different approach in other statutory contexts was employed
against Leon Caldwell in a later case where Leon tried to share in his
deceased son’s $2.9 million award from the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund award. 292 In that case, a Brooklyn, New York
Surrogate disqualified Leon from receiving any portion of the Fund
due to Leon’s abandonment. 293 Interestingly, one of the factors used
was the fact that about half of the $25,000 awarded to Leon earlier by
the Workers’ Compensation Board was actually paid to Elsie as
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 94–95 (Lahtinen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 95.
Crisman v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 774 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (App. Div. 2004).
In re Est. of Pessoni, 810 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298–99, 302 (Surr. Ct. 2005).
Id. at 300–01 (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 4-1.4(a) (Consol. 2022)).
Cf. Magwood v. Tate, 835 So. 2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
nonbiological father cannot receive proceeds from estate of a deceased child even
though the nonbiological father took care of the child when young).
292. Estate of Kenneth M. Caldwell (N.Y. Surr. Ct. Dec. 17, 2007), 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB.
L.J. 221, 223 (2008); Gloria Campisi, Absent Dad Cut From Estate of 9/11 Victim
PHILA.
INQUIRER
(Dec.
19,
2007),
Son,
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/hp/news_update/20071219_Absent_dad_cut_from_e
state_of_9_11_victim_son.html [https://perma.cc/B74C-3L97].
293. Estate of Kenneth M. Caldwell, supra note 292, at 226.
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arrears in child support. 294 Justice was substantially, if not fully done,
in the end.
In Caldwell, there were compelling reasons to differentiate
between legal parentage in two settings, support obligation and
recovery upon death. 295 But reason did not prevail. No longer should
the term father be given a “usual and commonly understood
meaning.” 296 In fact the term father should not be used and be
replaced by the term parent.
More importantly, parenthood should be differently defined by
state lawmakers by context where public policies differ. But
comparable definitions are needed where policies are similar.
General Assemblies should act explicitly since judges may not
employ “common sense” unless directed to do so by legislators. In
Caldwell and similar settings, statutes should also recognize
recoveries founded on new parentage forms, like de facto
parenthood, that are legally established for the first time after
children’s deaths.
Fortunately, the Caldwell approach is not followed outside of New
York. In 2003, the New Mexico Court of Appeals barred wrongful
death benefits for a biological father who had abandoned his child
over a decade before the child’s death in 1986. 297 In Perry v.
Williams, the court noted that while the relevant statute did not
expressly say that abandonment precludes recovery (as did the
Probate Code), common law and public policy barred relief. 298 The
court also noted that the biological father had “failed to cooperate in
the necessary testing for a bone marrow transplant though asked.”299
The father was told that his son had cancer, that he was “one of three
possible donors,” and that the other two donors did not match. 300 The

294. Id. at 224.
295. See Caldwell v. All. Consulting Grp., 775 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94–96 (App. Div. 2004)
(Lahtinen, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 93 (majority opinion) (quoting Orens v. Novello, 753 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (App.
Div. 2002)).
297. Perry v. Williams, 70 P.3d 1283, 1284 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). Perry was followed in
Gonzales v. Bustos, No. 31,872, 2012 WL 2327644 (N.M. Ct. App. May 29, 2012),
cert. granted, 295 P.3d 600 (N.M. 2012), cert. denied, 296 P.3d 491 (N.M. 2012).
298. See Perry, 70 P.3d at 1286–89 (“We do not lightly assume that the legislature
intended to alter this common law principle when it enacted the Wrongful Death Act.
To the contrary, we believe that the legislature intended to incorporate this common
law principle into the Act when it was passed.”).
299. Id. at 1285.
300. Id.
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Perry court followed the dissent’s reasoned approach in Caldwell,
employing “common sense.” 301
Comparably, in Louisiana in 1992, an appeals court held a
nonbiological “legal” father, per a spousal parent presumption, could
not bring an action upon the death of a child as he had not developed
a “parental relationship” and “was a virtual stranger to the child.” 302
In New Jersey, some courts, in the absence of explicit statutory
language, will also deny to abandoning legal parents any recoveries
flowing from their children’s deaths. Thus, in 2008, a court denied a
neglectful mother’s right to collect via intestacy (i.e., no will)
proceeds from a personal injury recovery founded on her dead child’s
claims. 303 It sensibly concluded:
How cruel, ironic, and inequitable it would be to hold that
M.W. retained the right to inherit $1 million from the child
she burned, abused, neglected, and abandoned. Equity,
morality, and common sense dictate that physically or
sexually abusive parents have no right of inheritance by
intestacy. The contrary result would bespeak a thoughtless
jurisprudence warranting public disrespect. The applicable
principle of equity is that “equity will not suffer a wrong
without a remedy.” . . . In these extraordinary
circumstances, the inherent equitable powers of the Family
Part prevents the unjust enrichment of M.W. which would
result from the mechanical application of the intestacy
statute. 304
There is a simple solution to problems caused by late-arriving
deadbeat or neglectful legal parents looking for easy money, whether
in tort or probate. The answer is legislation. In Perry, there was
legislation on the effects of parental abandonment in probate, but not

301. See id. at 1287; Caldwell, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 95 (Lahtinen, J., dissenting) (“Under New
York law, a parent who abandons a child . . . is disqualified from a share of wrongful
death proceeds . . . . [T]his principle—which is little more than an articulation of
common sense—has roots in the common law . . . .”).
302. Gnagie v. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Res., 603 So. 2d 206, 214 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
See also Udomeh ex rel. S.U. v. Joseph, 103 So. 3d 343, 348 (La. 2012).
303. N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. M.W., 942 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2007) (also holding that parental rights could be retroactively terminated). The
court recognized, id. at 20 n.6, that there were conflicting opinions in New Jersey, as
with In re Rogiers, 933 A.2d 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
304. N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs., 942 A.2d at 18.
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in wrongful death. 305 Elsewhere, legislation is more consistent,
though somewhat forgiving of certain bad parents. Under a Kentucky
statute,
a parent may not recover proceeds of a child’s estate . . . if
he has willfully abandoned the child unless he resumed the
care and maintenance of the child at least one year prior to
his or her death, or was deprived of custody by court . . . and
substantially complied with Orders requiring contribution to
the support of the child. 306
A Minnesota statute bars a parent from “inheriting from or through
a child if . . . the child died before reaching eighteen . . . and there is
clear and convincing evidence that immediately before the child’s
death the parental rights . . . could have been terminated . . . on the
basis of nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect” or other
comparable actions. 307 In Louisiana, a nonmarital father can pursue a
wrongful death claim where he seeks to avow paternity based on a
biological relationship, earlier support, and an earlier parentage
acknowledgment related to the deceased child. 308
Regardless of the approach to a child abandonment and to the
effects of a resumption of childcare, legislators should employ
gender-neutral terms. Whether in tort or probate proceedings, a child
may have parents who do not fit the father/mother mold. What should
be key in recovery cases involving parental establishments and
disestablishments is the parental or parental-like acts of those seeking
recovery for harms due to their children’s deaths.
Lawmakers must also recognize the relevance of the new forms of
parenthood, as with de facto parentage and intended parentage in
assisted reproduction settings, in money recovery cases benefitting
305. Perry, 70 P.3d at 1287.
306. Calhoun v. Sellers, No. 2008-CA-001311-DG, 2009 WL 3231506, at *3 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2006) (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.033(1) (West 2022), which says a
“parent who has willfully abandoned the care and maintenance of his or her child
shall not have a right to intestate succession in any part of the estate . . .”). See also
Simms v. Est. of Blake, 615 S.W.3d 14, 20–23 (Ky. 2021) (citing KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 411.130 and 411.137, which recognize wrongful death recovery by “mother
and father of the deceased,” but deny the “right to maintain a wrongful death action”
for a child of a “parent who has willfully abandoned the care and maintenance of his
or her child”). Would eliminating “his or her,” or replacing “mother and father” with
“parent” undo the policy? Clearly not.
307. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-114(a) (West 2021). Various states have enacted similar
provisions. Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-114(A)(2) (West 2021); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
42-1-11(a)(2) (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-114(1)(b) (West 2022).
308. Udomeh v. Joseph, 103 So. 3d 343, 351 (La. 2012).
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parents where requisite parental or parental-like relationships were
established, but not yet recognized by a state agency or a court before
the children were harmed. An alleged de facto or intended parent,
who demonstrates a fulfillment of the legal parent guidelines within a
statutory childcare parent scheme, grieves a child’s loss or harm
though not yet on a birth certificate or on a family court parentage
order. Yet such grievants are often not explicitly included in recovery
statutes (including tort and probate) and are not expressly recognized
in Uniform Parentage Acts as parents entitled to recoveries. 309
VIII.

EXPECTING PARENT

Expecting parents are those who have childcare rights or interests
in those yet to be born. These rights or interests arise in varying
ways, including by signing prebirth VAPs; 310 by consenting either
prepregnancy or post-pregnancy to intended parenthood in those to
be born of (surrogacy or nonsurrogacy) assisted reproduction; 311 or
by registering with the state as putative parents who are entitled to
notice and hearing in any later adoption or parental rights termination
proceeding involving later-born children. 312 In the VAP setting,
childcare rights arise at birth for those who properly executed
prebirth acknowledgments. 313 In some putative parent registry and
assisted reproduction settings, certain expecting parents are usually
without childcare rights at the time of birth, having instead parental
opportunity interests 314 which may lead to childcare rights after birth
309. Of course, parents who are unrecognized formally under the law grieve when their
perceived children are harmed, though not killed, by others. If their children are
harmed, tort claims should be available to these parents upon proof of parentage under
law which is presented to and determined by courts.
310. As noted, VAPs may also be executed post-birth. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §
304(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
311. As noted, there are also recognized consents to parenthood after a child is born of
nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction. See, e.g., id. § 704(b) (permitting consent in a
record “before, on, or after birth”).
312. Putative parent registries generally can also be employed after children are born. See,
e.g., id. § 402(a) (requiring a man desiring notification to register “not later than 30
days after the birth”).
313. Id. §§ 304(b), 305(a).
314. The parental opportunity interests of sperm donors in children later to be born of
consensual sex to those who are unmarried were recognized as constitutionally
protected in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (“natural father [has] an
opportunity . . . to develop a relationship with his offspring”). Such interests as yet
need not be afforded by states where there are births to those who are then married to
others (or who marry others soon after birth). See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 129–30 (1989) (finding, per four justices, that “[i]t is a question of legislative
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if the expecting parents act in certain ways. Sometimes expecting
parents have even more contingent childcare interests, as when
genetic surrogacy contracts may be voided by those scheduled to
give, or by those who gave birth, 315 or as when VAPs are rescinded
by those giving birth. 316
Expecting childcare parent laws are reviewed in detail in the
following sections, with observations on irrational laws. 317 These
sections are followed by a brief account of how expecting legal
parentage do and should operate outside of care, custody and control
contexts. 318
A. Expecting Voluntary Acknowledgment Parent
As noted, for existing children both the 1973 UPA and the 2000
UPA recognize a “man” can undertake an acknowledgment of
“paternity” of a “child.” 319 Under the 2017 UPA, “an alleged genetic
father,” an “intended” assisted reproduction (nonsurrogacy) parent,
or a “presumed parent” (spousal or residency/hold out), can sign a
VAP together with the “woman who gave birth.” 320 A VAP under the
2017 UPA can be signed “before . . . the birth of the child,” with
parentage taking effect “on the birth of the child” if the VAP is filed

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

policy and not constitutional law whether California will allow the presumed
parenthood of a couple desiring to retain a child conceived and born into their
marriage to be rebutted”). State laws thus can disallow parental opportunity interests
for those biologically tied to children who are born into the marriages of others where
the marital couple opposes any attempt at rebutting spousal parentage, as such an
approach was sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court when reviewing an earlier
California law. See id. Some current state laws disallow such spousal parentage
rebuttals. See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1055–56 (1999) (holding
spousal parent presumption for husband not rebuttable by genetic father where
marriage remains intact). But see Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 191–92 (Iowa
1999) (concluding unwed biological father had an Iowa Due Process liberty interest in
parenting his biological child, so he could challenge spousal parentage over the
husband’s objection).
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 814(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (withdrawal of
consent “any time before 72 hours after the birth”).
See id. § 308(a) (rescission of parentage acknowledgment within 60 days).
See infra Sections VIII(i)–(v).
See infra Part IX.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(5) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (presumption of paternity);
but see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002) (no
presumption of paternity).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
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prebirth. 321 Yet VAP parentage is contingent, because VAPs can be
rescinded within 60 days after birth by those who earlier signed. 322
Few states currently authorize prebirth VAPs to aid expecting
parents who wish to better secure their parental interests. 323 This is
unfortunate as prebirth VAPs promote sensible public policy. The
policy is best promoted, however, by a statute allowing an alleged
gamete provider, that is, either an egg or sperm provider, to sign
together with the person giving birth, who may or may not identify as
a woman. Such a statute would benefit, for example, an egg donor
who does not meet the statutory criteria on intended parentage via a
record in assisted reproduction settings. But, as noted, the
Connecticut Parentage Act, effective in 2022 and following the 2017
UPA, fails to recognize this policy.324 Further, allowance of prebirth
gender-neutral VAPs opens doors, perhaps otherwise closed, to
legitimate governmental interests in securing monetary support
promoting live and healthy births of future children and in remedying
harms incurred by those who excitedly awaited parenthood only to
have tortious acts intervene.
B. Expecting Nonsurrogacy Assisted Reproduction Parent
Children to be born through nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction
often have two expecting parents, sometimes recognized
preconception, sometimes recognized only during a pregnancy, and
sometimes only recognized after birth. Conduct after live births of
some can bar later parentage for others who were expecting legal
parents. UPA-suggested childcare parentage laws illustrate, providing
examples of irrationalities in legal parenthood.
In nonsurrogacy settings, the 1973 UPA only recognized an
assisted reproduction birth undertaken by a married, opposite-sex
couple who employed “a licensed physician” and “semen donated by
a man” other than the husband. 325 The donor here is “treated in law
321. Id. § 304(b)–(c).
322. Id. § 308(a).
323. But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 304(b) (West 2022); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.26A.215(2) (West 2022); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8.1-304(b) (West 2022).
All substantially follow the 2017 UPA.
324. See Conn. Parentage Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §26(a) (West 2022) (permitting
prebirth acknowledgment, but requiring “presumed parents” to satisfy other statutory
requirements). Elsewhere, other states similarly follow the 2017 UPA. See 15 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8.1-302 (West 2022) (no VAP for “an intended parent” via
assisted reproduction); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 310(b)(2) (West 2022) (a
person who is “an intended parent” is not eligible).
325. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973).
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as if he were not the natural father.” 326 The husband is only “treated
in law as if he were the natural father” if insemination occurred
“under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent”
of the husband. 327 So a spouse of one giving birth via assisted
reproduction can escape parentage if no consent was given, but
cannot escape presumed parentage though no consent was given to a
birth via extramarital sex. 328 Covert assisted reproduction choices by
one spouse are not imputed to another spouse, but covert sexual
liaisons and childbirth decisions are imputed. 329
The 2000 UPA expands parentage opportunities for nonspouses
who provide sperm, 330 as well as for nondonor men who consent to
nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction “with the intent to be the
parent.” 331 Such donors and consenting nondonor men are expecting
legal parents whose parentage arises when children are born. 332 The
“husband” of a “wife” who gives birth via assisted reproduction has
limited opportunities, however, to “challenge his paternity” 333 in
settings where there is no resulting parentage at birth for a
nonspousal sperm provider (e.g., consent withdrawal) or for a
nondonor man who withdraws an earlier consent to assisted
reproduction with “the intent to be the parent” and the
donor/nondonor are not thereafter pursued for child support. 334
The 2017 UPA further expands parentage opportunities in
nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction settings, broadening the range of
possible expecting nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction parents.335
That act is “substantially similar” to the 2000 UPA, though it is

326. Id. § 5(b). Seemingly, sperm donation by a nonspouse in a do-it-yourself assisted
reproduction setting might lead to the donor being deemed the “natural father,”
especially where child support is needed. See id. (failing statutory requirements in this
circumstance because no licensed physician is present).
327. Id. § 5(a).
328. See id. § 4(a) (presumed spousal parentage). The presumption can be rebutted under
certain circumstances. See id. § 4(b).
329. Compare 1973 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT consent requirements in § 4(a) (presumptions
connected to marriage) with those in § 5 (artificial insemination).
330. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002).
331. See id. §§ 703–704 (consent “must be in a record” that is signed).
332. See id. § 703 (“A man who provides sperm . . . is a parent of the resulting child.”).
333. See id. § 705. One opportunity involves a lack of consent, “before or after birth of the
child,” shown in a proceeding brought “within two years after learning of the birth.”
Id. § 705(a). Another opportunity involves a challenge at any time where there was
either no sperm donation or no consent; no cohabitation “since the probable time of
assisted reproduction”; and no open hold out of the child as one’s own. Id. § 705(b).
334. Id. § 703.
335. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
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updated so as to apply “equally to same-sex couples.” 336 Thus, an
“individual” who consents to assisted reproduction by a woman with
the intent to be a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction
is a parent of the child. 337 Where there is a nonsurrogacy assisted
reproduction birth having no such person who consents with the
intent to be a parent, again the spouse of the person giving birth has
limited opportunities to challenge the spouse’s parentage. 338 The
2017 UPA expansion of parentage opportunities is laudable. But is
there anything added by describing consents by “same-sex couples”
rather than by two people?
Unfortunately, the 2017 UPA is not followed in most states.339
Current state laws on nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction create
irrational distinctions between persons who wish to undertake
parentage without sex. For example, in Alabama the statute explicitly
recognizes only a husband’s consent to assist reproduction by his
wife. 340 In New Mexico, an intended parent who does not indicate
consent “in a record” prior to the “placement of the eggs, sperm or
embryos” cannot be a parent unless that person “during the first two
years of the child’s life, resided in the same household with the child
and openly held out the child as the parent’s own.” 341 While
husbands and non-husbands are treated comparably, practically
speaking intended do-it-yourself parents are treated quite differently,
and with no good reasons, from intended parents who employ
medical and legal advisors. 342 In North Dakota, the assisted
reproduction statute explicitly covers only “a woman” and “a man,”
where the “man” need not be a sperm provider. 343 It is irrational to
exclude other intended parents, as they are generally not more likely
to shirk their parental duties or forego their parental rights upon birth.

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at art. 7, introductory cmt.
Id. § 703.
See id. § 705(a) (spouse “at the time of the child’s birth”).
But see, e.g., 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8.1-704 (West 2021) (following 2017
UPA).
ALA. CODE § 26-17-703 (2021). Texas and Utah have a similar law in effect. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.703 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703 (West
2021).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-704(A)–(B) (West 2021).
See id. § 40-11A-704(C).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-61 (West 2021). Wyoming has a similar statue. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-904 (West 2021).
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C. Expecting Surrogacy Assisted Reproduction Parent
The 1973 UPA “does not deal with many complex and serious
legal problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination”
outside of the practice employed by a consenting “husband” and a
“wife” who act “under the supervision of a licensed physician.” 344
The 2000 UPA recognizes a “prospective gestational mother” may
agree with “intended parents” who are a “man” and a “woman” that
“the intended parents become parents of the child.” 345 Such an
agreement must be validated by a court in a proceeding commenced
by “the intended parents and the prospective gestational mother.”346
While there is yet no pregnancy, such an agreement may be
terminated by the prospective gestational mother, her husband, or
either of the intended parents. 347 Seemingly after pregnancy, a “court
for good cause shown may terminate the gestational agreement.” 348
Upon the birth of a child pursuant to a validated gestational
agreement, a court will issue an order “confirming that the intended
parents are the parents of the child.” 349 A gestational agreement “that
is not judicially validated is not enforceable.” 350 Further, should a
prospective gestational mother deliver a child not conceived through
assisted reproduction, “genetic testing” is used to “determine the
parentage of the child.” 351
While the 2000 UPA treated comparably gestational agreements
where the “prospective gestational mother” utilized one or two
donors, 352 the 2017 UPA distinguishes the requirements for
gestational (i.e., two donors) 353 and genetic (i.e., one donor)354
surrogacy agreements. Some requirements for enforceable pacts are

344. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973).
345. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002) (signatories
also include the “husband” of the prospective gestational mother and “a donor or the
donors”).
346. Id. § 802(a).
347. Id. § 806(a).
348. Id. § 806(b) (cause is left undefined, per Comment to § 806).
349. Id. §§ 807(a) (notice filed with court by the intended parents), 807(c) (notice filed
with court by the gestational mother or the appropriate state agency).
350. Id. § 809.
351. Id. § 807(b).
352. Id. § 801(a) (written agreement including “a donor or the donors”).
353. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (woman using “gametes that
are not her own”).
354. Id. § 801(1) (woman using “her own gamete”).
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comparable, 355 while others differ, with genetic surrogacy pacts
having more stringent requirements. 356
Importantly, the 2017 UPA was somewhat progressive regarding
gendered terms. For example, it authorized agreements involving
“one or more intended parents” 357 as compared to 2000 UPA
agreements encompassing “intended parents” who are a “man” and a
“woman.” 358
Significant, as well, is the effective characterization in the 2017
UPA of an intended parent in a genetic surrogacy setting as a
contingent legal parent for 3 days following the surrogate giving
birth, since the surrogate has 72 hours to withdraw consent to the
surrogacy agreement. 359 Upon the genetic surrogate’s withdrawal of
consent within the 3 day period, the surrogate establishes a “parentchild relationship” as the surrogate is “the individual” who gave birth
to the child. 360 But some intended parents may also establish a
“parent-child relationship” even upon such withdrawals. 361 Thus, an
intended parent who is a sperm provider can become a legal parent
upon birth if the provider, with the genetic surrogate, signed a
parentage acknowledgment before birth and the VAP remains
unrescinded and unchallenged. 362
Again, unfortunately some current state laws create questionable
distinctions between persons who can undertake parentage via
surrogacy assisted reproduction births. 363 For example, in Illinois the
355. See, e.g., id. §§ 802(a)(1)–(5) (noting to execute an agreement, a woman must be 21
years old, have previously given birth, and have independent legal representation),
803 (describing the process for executing an agreement).
356. Compare, e.g., id. § 814(a)(2) (genetic surrogate may withdraw consent any time
before 72 hours after the birth), with § 808(a) (allowing termination of agreement
“any time before an embryo transfer”).
357. Id. § 801(3).
358. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002).
359. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 814(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
360. Id. §§ 201(1) (parent-child relationship for individual who gives birth), 815(c) (stating
that upon withdrawal, “parentage of the child” is determined under Articles 1 through
6).
361. See generally id. § 815.
362. Id. §§ 201(5) (parent-child relationship for individual who acknowledges parentage),
301 (woman giving birth and “alleged genetic father” may sign acknowledgment),
304(b)–(c) (acknowledgment signed before birth becomes effective at birth), 308–309
(procedures for rescission and challenge of parentage acknowledgment), 815(c).
363. Surrogacy assisted reproduction laws seemingly prompt other constitutional
problems, as when they fail to recognize the procreational interests of all those
seeking to become parents. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01(2) (West 2021)
(“gestational carrier” agrees with “intended parents”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213(2)(c)
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intended parent(s) must have some gametes contribution and some
“medical need” for a gestational surrogacy. 364 In Florida, a
“gestational surrogacy contract” must include, as intending parents, a
“commissioning couple” who are “legally married.” 365 In Louisiana,
“the legislature has restricted the range of enforceable gestational
surrogacy agreements to those where the parties who engage the
gestational surrogate are not only married to each other, but also
create the child using their own gametes.” 366
D. Expecting Putative Parent
As with some VAPs and certain assisted reproduction pacts on
intended childcare parentage for future children, putative parent
registries recognize declarations of expecting (as well as current)
legal parenthood. 367 Yet such registries usually involve unilateral
declarations so that actual parenthood for the declarant is less certain
because there is no simultaneous declaration by a person who gave
birth, a pregnant person, or a nonpregnant prospective child bearer on
the future parenthood of the declarant. Putative parent registries
generally provide that those who register will receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard in any later adoption or parental rights
termination proceeding involving the later born child, 368 earlier
described as the future child of a named prospective child bearer. 369

364.
365.
366.

367.
368.

369.

(West 2021) (discussing preplanned adoption by “intended father” and “intended
mother”).
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47 / § 20(b)(1)–(2) (West 2021).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 2021) (providing that both the surrogate and each
commissioning individual must be at least 18 years old).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718.1 (West 2021). But see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 402(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (providing that a
man must register “not later than 30 days after the birth”).
These adoption-related registries are distinct from adoption registries which facilitate
information exchanges between those adopted and those who placed children for
adoption. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.460 (West 2021); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 15-7.2-2 (West 2021). They are also distinct from child maltreatment
registries, which can effectively bar listed “perpetrators” from certain employment
opportunities. See, e.g., Colleen Henry & Vicki Lens, Marginalizing Mothers: Child
Maltreatment Registries, Statutory Schemes, and Reduced Opportunities for
Employment, 24 CUNY L. REV. 1, 2 (2021).
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 407(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973) (woman who is the
“subject of a registration”).
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The 1973 UPA had no model law on putative parent registries. 370
For adoption proceedings, it required notice to “a presumed
father,” 371 to one who is determined to be a “father” by a court, 372 or
to “a father as to whom the child is a legitimate child.” 373
The 2000 UPA, by contrast, contains an article on “Registry of
Paternity.” 374 Registration is designed to protect the parental
opportunity interests of “a man who desires to be notified of a
proceeding for adoption of, or termination of parental rights
regarding, a child he may have fathered.” 375 Registration must occur
“before the birth of the child or within 30 days after the birth.” 376
Failure to so register leads to automatic termination of the parental
rights of a nonexempt man where the child has not attained one year
of age at the time of termination. 377 Where the child is one year of
age or older, in adoption or termination proceedings notices are
required to “every alleged father . . . whether or not he has
registered.” 378 Such notices are designed to protect “those fathers
who may have had some informal or de facto relationship with the
child or mother for some time,” preventing “unilateral action to
adversely affect” the alleged father’s rights. 379 Evidently, prebirth
child support and post-birth childcare and child support before a child
is one year old are per se insufficient to establish residency/hold out
or de facto parent-child relationships.

370. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002), cmt.
(citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248 (1983)).
371. Under the 1973 UPA, a presumed father was one who was married to, or who tried to
marry, a certain child bearer, as well as an alleged hold out/resident parent or a
voluntary paternity acknowledger. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (UNIF. L.
COMM’N 1973).
372. See id. § 24(2).
373. See id. § 24(3).
374. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2002).
375. See id. § 402(a).
376. See id.
377. See id. § 404, cmt. (a procedure said to facilitate greatly “infant adoption”). Exempted
are men who have already established “a parent-child relationship” under law or who
commenced paternity cases before a parental rights termination proceedings
commenced. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 402(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (a
procedure said to facilitate greatly “infant adoption”). Exempted are men who have
already established “a parent-child relationship” under law or who commenced
paternity cases before a parental rights termination proceeding commenced. See id. §
402(b).
378. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 405 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002).
379. See id., cmt. (discussing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248 (1983)).
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The 2017 UPA generally follows the 2000 UPA on Registry of
Paternity, limiting its effect to cases in which the child is less than
one year old at the time of a court hearing on adoption or parental
rights termination. 380 While there were said to be no “substantive
changes,” 381 the 2017 Act was described as replacing “gendered
terms with gender-neutral ones where appropriate.” 382
Yet the 2017 UPA is not gender-neutral where it might be. For
example, it speaks of a “man” and “his genetic child” rather than a
person and a child conceived with the person’s sperm. 383 More
importantly, it does not recognize prebirth expecting parent
registrations by those whose sperm or egg donations prompted
assisted reproduction conception where those donors were the
spouses of those to be bearing children. 384 Thus, if the spousal child
bearer placed the child for adoption by another person, or sought sole
state custody of the child through the termination of any other
parental interests, the state and its courts may not know of the
relevant marriage. Expanded registrations would aid, for example,
spousal donors whose presumptive spousal parent status was
otherwise unknown to the state and its courts.
Even more importantly, the 2017 UPA does not recognize
expecting parent registrations by nonspousal gamete donors and
nondonors who are the intended parents of children to be born of
nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction 385 where their consents are not in
a “record,” but where nonrecord consents can nevertheless prompt
parentage, as through proof of an express agreement by clear-andconvincing evidence. 386 The state and its courts are far less likely to
know of nonrecord childcare pacts than of marriages.

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
Id. art. 4, cmt. para. 3.
Id.
Id. § 402.
Id. § 412, cmt. (establishing that the search of the state registry as part of an
adoption/parental rights termination proceeding “does not apply to a child born
through assisted reproduction”). This comment to § 412 was “added to clarify that
individuals who have children through assisted reproduction” are not required to
conduct a search of the paternity registry, which was not designed or intended to
address such situations. Presumably, a sperm donor’s clarification of an earlier nonrecord agreement to rear a child born of assisted reproduction is not a substantial
change. See, for example, Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital
Presumption for the Modern Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 248–54 (2019) for a brief
history of the marital parent presumption.
385. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 412 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
386. Id. § 704(b)(1).
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Paternity registries in some form are employed by more than half
of the states. 387 The 2000 UPA noted that as of May 2000, “at least
28 states had enacted legislation creating paternity registries.” 388 The
2017 UPA recognizes that a “substantial number of legislatures”
enacted registries in response to a 1983 U.S. Supreme Court decision
and its aftermath. 389 Even where the 2017 UPA is otherwise
substantially enacted, its “Registry of Paternity” provisions may not
be included. 390
Not unlike the 2000 and 2017 UPAs on “Registry of Paternity,”
state registry laws generally address paternity declarations by
putative fathers. 391 Some laws may go further, as in Alabama where
the “putative father registry” contains the names of “any person
adjudicated by a court . . . to be the father of a child born out of
wedlock” 392 and any person who filed a VAP with the registry. 393 In
Arizona, the paternity registry is open to one “who is a father or
claims to be the father” of a child who may be placed for an adoption
where receipt of notice is desired. 394 In some areas there is a compact
for sharing putative father registry information. 395
Most importantly, however, state registry laws fail to provide
opportunities to receive notices of adoptions for many expecting and
existing legal parents. The aforenoted excluded parents from the
2017 UPA model are excluded from current state laws. 396 Registry
laws sometimes foreclose an expecting legal parent who had no real
opportunity to become an existing legal parent, though possessing
constitutional interests in achieving childcare parentage. 397 Thus in
Arkansas, a registering putative father only has “rights attach” after
387. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED FATHERS 3 (2018),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3AS-T3EZ].
388. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 4 cmt. para. 1 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2000) (amended 2002).
389. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 4 cmt. para. 1 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2017) (referencing Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983)).
390. See, e.g., 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8.1-401 to 403 (West 2021) (adopting the Uniform
Parentage Act while omitting paternity registry provisions).
391. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 387.
392. Compare ALA. CODE § 26-10C-1(a)(1), (3) (2021) (“any person”), with ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-18-701(5) (West 2021) (“‘putative father’ means any man”).
393. ALA. CODE § 26-10C-1(a)(1) (2021).
394. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01(A) (2021).
395. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121.5(1) (West 2021) (limiting registrations to
men who had sexual relationships with women outside of marriage).
396. See supra notes 392–95.
397. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (describing the constitutional interest of
a biological parent when a child is born to one who is unwed as “an opportunity that
no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring”).
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establishing “a significant custodial, personal or financial relationship
with the child,” 398 with the rights then including notices about a
possible adoption and notices about a parental rights termination
proceeding. 399 Further, effective registration sometimes only insures
notice of an adoption proceeding, and not notice of a nonadoption
termination of parental rights proceeding. 400
E. Expecting Grieving Parent
As with grieving legal parents in, e.g., tort and probate settings,
some grieving expecting parents should be legally recognized in
these (and other) settings where care, custody, and control parental
interests may not have ripened because of prebirth (including
preconception and postconception) losses of expected future children.
Such losses are often recognized today in postconception tort cases
for those whose later parentage would arise from consensual sex or
assisted reproduction pacts. Yet recognitions may not fully extend to
all those who grieve the losses of their perceived future children, as
with biological fathers of potential children to be born of consensual
sex with unwed mothers, where the fathers failed to seize parental
opportunities during pregnancies. 401
In the tort (and contract) setting there are some available
preconception claims, such as where drugmakers cause infertility in
those wishing to childbear. 402
Comparably in tort (and contract) there are some postconception
but prebirth claims, as where stillbirths are prompted by negligent
drivers 403 or medical personnel. 404
In probate, there too might be grieving expecting parents who
should be recognized as heirs to any estate properties of their future
children. Such recognitions are most likely where future children are
398. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-702(a)(3) (West 2021).
399. Id. § 702(a)(2) (stating that effective registration prompts “notice of legal proceedings
pertaining to the child”).
400. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50 / § 12.1 (West 2021).
401. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262–64 (discussing constitutionally-protected parental opportunity
interests). Failure to provide pregnancy support can foreclose notice and participation
rights of unwed biological fathers in adoption proceedings occurring shortly after
birth. See, e.g., In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374, 377–78 (N.C. 2014)
(interpreting the notice provision of a North Carolina statute).
402. See, e.g., Moll v. Abbott Laboratories, 506 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Mich. 1993) (ruling on
when claim involving pharmaceutical product liability for infertility accrued).
403. See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 902 (N.Y. 1969) (deciding whether
emotional distress and funeral expense damages are recoverable).
404. See, e.g., Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 42 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Ark. 2001) (discussing
whether a wrongful death statute includes viable fetuses as persons able to recover).
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foreclosed by postconception but prebirth negligent or other acts
prompting recoveries on behalf of the unborn. 405
Here, challenging issues can arise regarding the identities of
expecting grieving parents. Consider, for example, a tort case where
postconception negligent acts prompt stillbirths and money damage
opportunities for expecting parents. In genetic surrogacy cases, note
that the 2017 UPA, and one state law, allow contract recissions by
the surrogates within certain hours after birth. 406 Are there at some
points three grieving parents, or four grieving parents, should the
surrogate be married to one who is not one of the two intended
parents? And in a case with an expecting putative biological parent
with potential childcare interests (as arise from some consensual sex
acts or assisted reproduction pacts), 407 what norms should govern
parentage identifications?
IX. CONCLUSION
The continuing (r)evolution in childcare parenthood under law (i.e.,
constitutional and nonconstitutional parental interests in the care,
custody, and control of children) has been chiefly spurred by the
dramatic increases in assisted reproduction births and informal child
adoptions; that is, adoptions recognized only after the completion of
post-birth acts, as found by courts, which often include same
household residency and parental-like relationships.408 This
(r)evolution in childcare parenthood laws has prompted limited
changes, however, in legal parenthood in other contexts, including
child support, probate, and tort. Changes in nonchildcare parentage
laws are needed. These changes should not always follow the
changes in childcare parentage. Parentage should be defined
contextually under law.
There are constitutional limits on parenthood laws, whatever the
context. The constraints are found in both federal and state
405. See, e.g., Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 (W. Va. 1995) (“Although some
jurisdictions do not permit a wrongful death action to be maintained for the death of
an unborn child, the majority of jurisdictions now do permit a wrongful death action if
the unborn child had reached the point of viability.”).
406. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 814(a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (allowing for
surrogacy contract recession within 72 hours of birth), with WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
26.26A.765(1)(b) (West 2021) (allowing for surrogacy contract recession within
forty-eight hours of birth).
407. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261–63 (1983) (discussing constitutionallyprotected parental opportunity interests in children with whom they have biological
ties).
408. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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constitutions. One common constraint is that parenthood laws must
be rational. 409 Rationality is necessary under both substantive Due
Process and Equal Protection. 410 To date, the rationality limits have
not been significantly applied to state policy choices, especially
outside of childcare parentage.
In fact, rationality requirements should now constrain many new
American parentage laws, as well as the influential parentage law
reforms proposed by the Uniform Law Commissioners in its Uniform
Parentage Acts. Further, some old nonchildcare parentage laws, as in
tort and probate, once sensible, have become irrational over time as
new childcare parentage laws, with their new public policies, have
emerged. There has been insufficient coordination of many older
parentage laws with the new public policies. Genetic ties,
heterosexual marriage, and consensual sex generally underlie old
laws, while same-sex marriage, transgender rights, parental-like acts,
and intentions about future parenthood, as well as genes, oppositesex marriages, and sex underlie many new laws.
This Article is the first to outline the irrationalities in many new
and old parentage laws. Irrationalities often arise when the laws
employ gendered terms like mother and father, husband and wife,
man and woman, and male and female. These terms require a parent
to be gender identified by the state even when such an identity
clashes with the parent’s own gender identification. More
importantly, these gendered terms frequently clash with the public
policies underlying parentage laws, new and old, that are not
dependent upon any form of gender identity. As a result, these terms
create differential treatment of people, as between state identified
men and state identified women, where the distinctions make no
sense.
Parentage laws should generally be designated for a person, sperm
donor, sperm provider, egg donor, egg provider, spouse, birthgiver,
and the like. Nongendered parentage laws, for many of us, will not
end our speaking of mothers and fathers. But such laws will sensitize
more of us to the preferences of some people without any diminution
of the underlying public policies. Some discomfort perhaps, but
hopefully greater respect for all within our communities.
This Article demonstrates the disconnect between gender identity
and the policies underlying parentage laws in several contexts,
including parenthood for childcare and child support purposes (as
with some spousal, assisted reproduction, and voluntary
409. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
410. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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acknowledgment parents); 411 for probate purposes (as with deceased
parents); 412 for tort purposes (as with grieving parents); 413 and for
expecting parent purposes (as with some voluntary acknowledgment,
assisted reproduction, and putative parents). 414
Beyond gender identity, irrationalities in parentage laws arise when
there are distinctions without policy justifications. In the childcare
parentage, there are troubling divides between a hold out/residency
and a de facto parent. Outside of childcare, there are troubling
parentage divides in survivorship, heirship, and personal injury
claims.

411.
412.
413.
414.

See discussion supra Parts II, IV–V.
See discussion supra Part VI.
See discussion supra Part VII.
See discussion supra Parts III–V.
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